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LITIGATION GOVERNANCE: TAKING
ACCOUNTABILITY SERIOUSLY
John C. Coffee, Jr. *
Both Europe and the United States are rethinking their approach to
aggregate litigation. In the United States, class actions have long been or-
ganized around an entrepreneurial model that uses economic incentives to
align the interest of the class attorney with those of the class. But increas-
ingly, potential class members are preferring exit to voice, suggesting that the
advantages of the U.S. model may have been overstated. In contrast, Europe
has long resisted the United States's entrepreneurial model, and the contem-
porary debate in Europe centers on whether certain elements of the U.S.
model-namely, opt-out class actions, contingent fees, and the "American
rule" on fee shifting-must be adopted in order to assure access to justice.
Because legal transplants rarely take, this Essay offers an alternative
"nonentrepreneurial model" for aggregate litigation that is consistent with
European traditions. Relying less on economic incentives, it seeks to design a
representative plaintiff for the class action who would function as a true
"gatekeeper," pledging its reputational capital to assure class members of its
loyal performance. Effectively, this model marries aspects of U.S. "public in-
terest" litigation with existing European class action practice. Examining
the differences between U.S. and European practice, this Essay argues none
of these differences is dispositively prohibitive and that functional substitutes,
including an opt-in class action and third-party funding, could be engi-
neered so as to yield roughly comparable results. Although the two systems
might perfm similarly in terms of compensation, the ultimate question, this
Essay argues, is the degree to which a jurisdiction wishes to authorize and
arm a private attorney general to pursue deterrence for profit.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholarship in the field of civil procedure has long been character-
ized by an incisive rigor-and a rule-bound tunnel vision. At its best, this
research is tightly focused, richly historical, and infinitely nuanced,' but it
tends to assume the persistence of the structural and organizational fea-
tures that principally define the status quo. Thus, much like goldfish
trapped in a bowl, even the best of procedural scholars may have diffi-
culty envisioning alternative structures and organizational forms. This
Essay presents an alternative way to conceptualize the well-known
problems of accountability in aggregate and class litigation: namely, as a
governance problem that can be managed in much the same way as other
governance problems.2
1. My colleague and friend, Henry Monaghan, has long been a master at this rule-
based genre. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against
Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1148, 1153 (1998) (arguing
nonresident class members should not be precluded from litigating their substantive
claims despite prior class judgment purporting to bind them).
2. Inherently, a governance perspective focuses on structural relationships,
particularly those by which (1) the members of the organization or entity define their
rights among themselves, and (2) authorize their agents to act for them. Most of corporate
governance addresses the principal/agent relationships between shareholders and
managers, and corporate law typically confers on shareholders the right to elect the board
of directors and to approve certain fundamental transactions (such as a merger, sale of
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The difference involves more than semantics. Despite recent scan-
dals and even the criminal convictions of leading class action plaintiffs'
attorneys,3 traditional procedural scholarship has remained largely re-
signed to the accountability problems that clearly afflict the U.S. class ac-
tion litigation system.4 This is not because these scholars approve of op-
substantially all the corporation's assets, or amendment of the certificate of
incorporation). In contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are largely silent on these
structural issues, requiring only that the court approving a class action settlement make
certain requisite findings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (specifying that court must approve
settlement of class action, hold hearing, and find settlement "fair, reasonable, and
adequate"). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, discussed infra notes 17,
32-33, 99-115 and accompanying text, presumptively makes the largest stakeholder in the
action the vicarious representative for all class members in the case of securities class
actions. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (2006). But there is no corresponding rule
governing nonsecurities class actions, which constitute the majority of class actions.
Instead, all is left to judicial discretion. Although few would recommend that important
issues facing the class be resolved by a majority vote (both because it is difficult to identify
class members prior to the case's resolution and because small claimants tend to be
rationally apathetic), civil procedure law has a void at its center to the extent that it only
obliquely addresses the rights and remedies of class members.
This Essay focuses on a key governance issue: whether class litigation should be
organized around an entrepreneurial model, as it certainly is in the United States, or a
nonentrepreneurial model, as Europe seems to favor. In a nonentrepreneurial model,
neither the attorneys nor the representative plaintiff will receive disproportionate benefits
from the action. Assessing these alternative models in any depth requires a broader
governance perspective.
3. In my judgment, the two best-known leaders of the plaintiffs' securities class action
bar were William S. Lerach and Melvyn I. Weiss. Both have served or are now serving
criminal sentences in federal prison for convictions in connection with concealing illegal
payments to class action plaintiffs who in effect serviced their law firms as in-house clients.
See Jonathan D. Glater, Class-Action Lawyer Given a 30-Month Prison Term for Hiding
Kickbacks, N.Y. Times, June 3, 2008, at C3 (discussing both convictions). In addition,
Richard F. Scruggs, who may have been an even more famous plaintiffs' attorney for his
success in winning a multibillion dollar settlement from the tobacco industry in the 1990s,
was also sentenced in 2008 for attempting to bribe a Mississippi state court judge. See
Abha Bhattarai, Class-Action Lawyer Given 5 Years In a Bribery Case, N.Y. Times, June 28,
2008, at C3 (discussing conviction).
4. Some academics simply deny that there is an accountability problem in class
actions. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 104-05 (2006)
(describing accountability problems as mostly a "mirage"). More academics agree that
there are problems, but still defend the securities class action as a necessary mechanism for
enhancing shareholder monitoring or generating general deterrence. See generally
Symposium, The Continuing Evolution of Securities Class Actions, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 151.
In that Symposium, Professors Merritt Fox and Jill Fisch argue that the securities class
action improves corporate governance, and Professor Lawrence Mitchell argues that it
generates deterrence. See Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private
Securities Litigation, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 333, 345-48 (seeking to justify litigation remedy as
compensating informed traders for losses stemming from fraudulent corporate
representations); Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers
Do Not Trade?, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 297, 310-18 (arguing mandatory disclosure regimes
enhance corporate efficiency); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The "Innocent Shareholder": An
Essay on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L.
290
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portunistic behavior by plaintiffs' attorneys, but because they see no
alternative that will retain the class action as an effective remedy for small
claimants. Tradeoffs are inevitable, but they should be faced candidly. In
order to protect small claimants, the United States has fashioned a
unique system of "entrepreneurial litigation" that rests on at least three
key elements:5
(1) The availability of the class action procedure, under which one
allegedly injured plaintiff can bring suit so as to bind not only oneself,
but all others similarly situated;6
Rev. 243, 243 (arguing securities liability provides incentives for shareholders to take
responsibility for market integrity). These academics are largely responding to new
critiques, made by a number of other academics, that the securities class action today yields
little compensation or deterrence. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities
Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534,
1534 (2006) [hereinafter Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action] (arguing
contemporary securities class actions provide minimal deterrence or compensatory
benefits). This Essay certainly does not seek to curtail class actions, but to survey the range
of possibilities for their reform and to consider alternative starting points for other
countries seeking for the first time to address aggregate litigation.
5. The uniqueness of the American procedures for aggregate litigation is widely
recognized. See Richard L. Marcus, Review Essay: Putting American Procedural
Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 709, 735 (2005) (noting
importance of class action in American civil procedure). The term "entrepreneurial
litigation" was probably first coined by this author (or at least legal databases do not show
earlier uses of the term in law reviews). See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54
U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1987). In an even earlier work, I modeled the plaintiffs attorney who
handles an inventory of contingent fee actions as a risk-taking entrepreneur. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev.
669, 701-24 (1986) (developing entrepreneurial model of contingent fee lawyering). Most
who use the term entrepreneurial litigation see three elements as defining it: (1) the
availability of the class action; (2) the contingent fee; and (3) the American rule under
which each side bears its own legal fees. But there are actually three other important
elements that facilitate entrepreneurial litigation in the United States: (1) the right to a
jury trial in common law cases brought in federal court (which is guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); (2) the availability of punitive damages;
and (3) the "common fund" doctrine that entitles a successful plaintiff who has created a
fund that benefits others to recover reasonable attorneys' fees from the fund based on
common law principles of restitution and unjust enrichment, see Boeing Co. v. Van
Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478-81 (1980) (discussing common fund doctrine); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 527 (1881) (acknowledging principles underlying common fund
doctrine). The first two of these additional elements cause defendants to fear the risk of
large recoveries, which would be unlikely in other countries where judges impose damages
and do not seek to punish the defendants for misconduct in civil cases; the third element,
the common fund doctrine, eliminates the need for each class member to consent to the
contingent fee. Effectively, it converts the contingent fee from something that is
contractually permissible to a legal right.
6. This development required not only a procedural rule (Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure), but also a constitutional theory as to why one litigant could bind
others who had not consented to the representation. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the
Supreme Court set forth the "due process minima" on such unconsented representation,
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 110:288
(2) The contingent fee under which a successful plaintiffs' attorney
will receive a fee awarded by the court that is likely to be in the range of
fifteen to thirty percent of the settlement or judgment;7 and
(3) The American rule on fee shifting under which each side nor-
mally bears its own legal costs (thus sparing the small claimant from expo-
sure to the defendant's legal expenses, which may deter persons from
serving as the representative plaintiff under the "loser pays" fee shifting
rule that applies generally in Europe).8
Collectively, these elements do solve the problem of providing a fea-
sible remedy for "negative value" claims-that is, those claims that, while
meritorious, have an enforcement cost in excess of their individual
value.9 But this benefit comes at the cost of creating principal-agent
problems that remain intractable despite repeated efforts by Congress
and the courts to curb highly visible abuses. This uncertain tradeoff be-
tween the costs and benefits of conferring vast discretion on plaintiffs'
attorneys has led others, Europeans in particular, to resist any shift to
U.S. style entrepreneurial litigation.1o
identifying three requisite elements: (1) individual notice; (2) an opportunity to exclude
oneself by opting out; and (3) adequate and unconflicted representation in the
proceeding. 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985).
7. The contingent fee predates the class action and arose first in the United States,
chiefly in personal injury litigation during the late nineteenth century. For a history of its
acceptance in the United States, see James Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale:
The "Acquisition of an Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation" Rules, 16 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 223, 229-30 (2003). By 1876, the Supreme Court had declared that the
lawfulness of contingent fees was "beyond legitimate controversy." See Stanton v. Embrey,
93 U.S. 548, 556-57 (1876) (discussing validity of contingent fees). For data on the typical
plaintiffs attorney's fee in class actions, see infra notes 24, 56, 59.
8. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975) (citing
cases affirming attorney's right to collect fee). The prevailing rule in the United States,
known as the "American Rule," requires litigants to pay their own attorneys' fees and costs
of litigation, absent special statutory provisions for fee shifting. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L.J. 651,
652-66 (analyzing various rationales for fee shifting rules). Limited exceptions to this rule
exist where one side has acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978) (discussing ability to award attorneys' fees where plaintiff
proceeds in bad faith); Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59 (discussing exceptions to American
rule). The opposing rule, that the losing side should pay the winning side's reasonable
fees, is known as the "English Rule."
9. Even courts of appeals critical of the class action have recognized that "the
existence of . . . negative value" claims constitutes the "most compelling rationale for
finding superiority in a class action." Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th
Cir. 1996). For a definition of the term "negative value claims" as "claims in which the
costs of enforcement in an individual action would exceed the expected individual
recovery," see In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 348 (N.D. Ohio
2001).
10. For a good and recent overview, see Christopher Hodges, The Reform of Class
and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems (2008); Richard Nagareda,
Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 19-37 (2009) (providing comparative analysis of recent developments in
Europe regarding aggregate litigation); Michael Gousgounis, Association-Driven Aggregate
292
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But what is the alternative? This Essay considers two alternatives: (1)
greater reliance on what it terms "exit-based" reforms as opposed to fur-
ther "voice-based" reforms, in part in order to introduce greater competi-
tion into the market for class action legal services;" and (2) a nonen-
trepreneurial model for aggregate litigation that may be more
compatible with legal cultures outside the United States.
Outside the United States, much of the world is actively seeking to
develop new approaches to aggregate litigation. Although reformers
have recognized the inadequacy of existing procedural mechanisms for
aggregating claims, they remain reluctant to buy into "entrepreneurial
litigation" and continue to search for intermediate options that stop short
of adopting either the contingent fee or the opt-out class action. This has
frustrated some U.S. academics, who have understandably opined in sub-
stance that "you-cannot-have-one-without-the-other." Without the contin-
gent fee and the opt-out class action, they argue, no mechanism for ag-
gregating negative value claims will be effective.12 But is this necessarily
true? Are intermediate compromises possible?
This Essay is premised on the belief that neither the optimality nor
the transportability of the U.S. class action system should be assumed.
Both the United States and Europe may in fact be unconsciously converg-
ing, the latter by cautiously opening the courthouse door to some forms
of aggregate litigation and the former by rigorously tightening the stan-
dards for class certification in a manner that has increasingly closed the
courthouse door. Both sides recognize that entrepreneurial litigation en-
ables negative value claims to be litigated, but a debate continues on both
sides of the Atlantic as to whether this benefit comes at an excessively
high cost by conferring extraordinary leverage on an often unaccounta-
ble agent: the class action attorney. The defense bar has long protested
(with obvious self-interest) that a consequence of this leverage is "extor-
tionate" litigation in which even nonmeritorious cases may obtain sub-
stantial settlements." Perhaps more importantly, an intense, low visibility
Litigation: Peanuts Effect and Democratization of Litigation Governance, 2-4 (May 1,
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1469046 (providing overview of recent European developments).
11. The terms "exit" and "voice" were first coined by the Harvard economist Albert 0.
Hirschman in 1970 to contrast rival strategies for influencing large organizations
(including governments). Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 4 (1970).
12. See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to
Europe?, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 179, 180-81 (2009) (arguing that need to incentivize class
counsel and representative plaintiff requires adoption in some form of American
innovations, such as contingency fee). Professors Issacharoff and Miller argue that
European reformers are so reluctant to adopt the central elements of the American model
that there is a danger "of throwing out the baby with the bathwater." Id. at 191. This line
between the baby and the bathwater may often lie in the eye of the beholder.
13. No sooner did the class action develop in the late 1960s than some proclaimed
that it would lead to "legalized blackmail." See, e.g., Milton Handler, The Shift from
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual
Antitrust Review, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1971). Both before and after that, an unending
2010] 293
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competition has arisen for the coveted position of class counsel because
the winner of this competition stands to capture significant rents. This
competition has been the underlying cause of recent scandals within the
plaintiffs' bar. Although the nature of this competition has recently
changed, its latest manifestation-pay-to-play contributions by plaintiffs'
law firms to public pension funds-may enable some competitors to un-
dercut the very reforms that Congress established to control class action
abuses.14 The vulnerability of these reforms, it will be argued, flows di-
rectly from the class action's special governance rules and reveals the
dangers of relying primarily on "voice," rather than "exit."
From a governance perspective, European resistance to the trans-
plantation of American class action rules should not be surprising. The
history of attempts at legal transplantation reveals many more failures
than successes. For example, after the break up of the Soviet Union
when corporate law reformers sought to transplant American rules to
Russia and other transitional economies to facilitate privatization, they
quickly found that the rules of Delaware corporate governance, while effi-
cient in their own environment, did not work effectively in Russia or
other developing economies.15 Indeed, in general, scholars have found
number of defense counsel (and some academics) regularly proclaimed securities and
corporate litigation to be particularly subject to "extortion." One can trace this critique
back well into the last century. See Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike
Suit, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1308 (1934) (discussing effects of "extortionate" securities
litigation). Empirical support for this claim is less in evidence. In enacting the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, however, Congress largely accepted the diagnosis
that the scales of justice had been tilted too far in the direction of plaintiffs. The
Conference Report accompanying that legislation emphasized the "abusive practices
committed in private securities litigation," including "routine filing of lawsuits against
issuers of securities and others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's stock
price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer." H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at
31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
14. Plaintiffs' law firms today make substantial political contributions to the political
officials responsible for, or with influence over, the public pension funds that typically
serve as "lead plaintiffs" in securities class actions. Their goal appears to be to induce these
lead plaintiffs to select them as class counsel. This practice-known as "pay-to-play"-has
been much discussed and reform legislation has been recently proposed. For an overview,
see James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1587 (2006) [hereinafter
Cox & Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?]. Professors Cox and Thomas discuss one well-
known case in which the New York State Comptroller received $200,000 in political
contributions from law firm partners (and the families of partners) at two law firms in the
year following their selection as co-class counsel to the New York State Comptroller, which
was serving as lead plaintiff in the action. Eventually, the two law firms received a $55
million fee award. Id. at 1611-12. Many public pension funds have internal governance
structures, such as independent boards, that are designed to protect them from pay-to-play
influences, and no universal criticism is here intended.
15. For one of the first and most influential statements of this thesis that corporate
legal rules work only within specific institutional and cultural contexts, see Bernard Black
& Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911
(1996). Their starting point is that "national contexts" shape corporate law. Id. at
294
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that transplanted legal rules tend to perform poorly, to be adopted in-
completely, and to wither quickly unless the local culture is receptive.1 6
Receptivity to the transplanted rule depends on its compatibility with the
existing legal culture.
Part I of this Essay begins by mapping the legal terrain and surveying
the range of organizational forms and governance rules employed to col-
lect negative value claims for aggregate litigation. Part II then turns to
the tools by which courts and legislatures can most feasibly assure ac-
countability in aggregate litigation. It finds that voice-based reforms (in-
cluding the "lead plaintiff' provision adopted by Congress to deal with
abuses in securities class actions1 7 ) have had only a modest impact, but a
less noticed and market-based development-namely, an increased rate
of opting out by institutional investors-has dramatically changed the
landscape of securities litigation and may imply an eventual end to heter-
ogeneous class actions that group large and small investors together.' 8
Because, in this Essay's terminology, the lead plaintiff provision is the par-
adigm of a voice-based reform, whereas opting out is an exit-based re-
form, this discussion sets the stage for a broader comparison of exit ver-
sus voice as the key policy levers in litigation governance. Part III then
turns to the European context and explores developments there involv-
ing alternative organizational structures for aggregate litigation. In par-
ticular, it finds that the perceived advantages of the opt-out class action
over the opt-in may have been overstated. Accordingly, it proposes an
1920-29. Cultural norms are very much part of this national context. For a similar
critique of the idea that law can be standardized successfully, see Katharina Pistor, The
Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 97
(2002) (arguing that attempts at legal standardization often impede economic
development).
16. A rich literature in law and economics has explored the difficulties in
transplanting legal rules (generally from developed countries to "emerging market"
nations). See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The
Transplant Effect, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 163, 161-67 (2003) (analyzing historical legal
transplants and proposing that success of transplant depends more on process than
content of legal rules). Although some transplanted legal rules do survive, these authors
find that transplants generally only take when they are adapted to local conditions or when
they find a receptive audience because that audience is already familiar with a similar
underlying structure to the law. Id. at 167-68. This Essay posits that this same "transplant
effect" will likely also limit the acceptance of exported litigation rules, just as it has in the
case of corporate law rules.
17. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a) (3) (B) (iii), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006) (creating presumption in favor of class member seeking
appointment as lead plaintiff who "in the determination of the court, has the largest
financial stake in the relief sought by the class"). This provision is discussed infra notes
32-33, 99-115 and accompanying text.
18. In an earlier article, I surveyed this trend toward increased opting out in securities
class actions. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class
Actions: Why "Exit" Works Better Than "Voice," 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 407, 425-29 (2008)
(describing trend of increased opting out by institutional investors). This Essay seeks to
place this development in a larger context and does not address (as the earlier article did)
the options by which courts could encourage or discourage opting out.
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
alternative, nonentrepreneurial model for Europe that recognizes the
need to incentivize risk taking in connection with aggregate litigation,
but does not rely on the attorney, as a self-appointed entrepreneur, to
both fund and control the litigation. Instead, it seeks to draw upon the
experience of U.S. public interest litigation to develop an alternative
model in which reputational capital substitutes for economic incentive.
This Essay draws comparisons between corporate governance and lit-
igation governance. This is not based on any assumption that corporate
law has solved the problem of accountability, but rather on the fact that
corporate (and also law and economics) scholarship long ago developed
a vocabulary for dealing with the issue of accountability that can be use-
fully applied to the litigation context. In particular, this Essay will focus
on the concept of "agency costs"19 and the tradeoffs between exit and
voice as tools by which to regulate the behavior of agents in aggregate
litigation.
I. A PRIMER ON LITIGATION GOVERNANCE
It is simplest to understand litigation governance by contrasting it
with corporate governance. Corporate governance deals essentially with
the relationships between investors and their agents: the directors, man-
agers, and employees of the firm. Although litigation governance also
comprehends all the principal-agent relationships affecting those who
will be bound by a legal proceeding brought on their behalf, the United
States adopts a fundamentally different rule to govern the relationship
between the principals and the agents in this context. In the corporate
governance context, an entrepreneur seeking to raise capital for a busi-
ness venture must convince investors to opt in and buy the securities of
the entrepreneur's start-up corporation. This means that the entrepre-
neur bears the agency costs of the venture, because to the extent that
investors are skeptical or uncertain about the entrepreneur's loyalty and
readiness to act in their best interests, they will either decline to invest or
will pay a lesser price for the securities. 20 In contrast, in the typical class
action in the United States, a plaintiffs' attorney will file a complaint that
may broadly define the class to consist of thousands of persons and enti-
ties, without the attorney having the prior consent of more than the attor-
19. For the standard definition of "agency costs," see Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308 (1976). Agency costs are defined as the sum of the
preventive costs taken by firms to limit misappropriations by their agents, the bonding
costs undertaken by agents themselves to demonstrate their loyalty, and the irreducible
minimum of losses from agent misconduct that it is not efficient to seek to prevent. For an
application of agency costs to class actions, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 19-27 (1991).
20. This is the key insight of the Jensen and Meckling model: The founders of a firm
bear the agency costs of investor uncertainty. But as next discussed, this insight has less
application to litigation governance.
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ney's individual client. Thereafter, it is up to the other class members to
opt out of the action.2 1 Typically, the class members will neither have the
right to select or replace the attorney nor to determine the attorney's fee
(which will instead be set by the court).22 In the case of negative value
claims, the class members will have little rational reason to opt out (be-
cause they cannot economically proceed on their own) and so they will
predictably remain rationally apathetic, staying within the class.
This day-and-night difference between an opt-in rule for corporate
governance and an opt-out one for litigation governance means that, un-
like the entrepreneur in corporate governance, the attorney-entrepre-
neur does not bear the agency costs of the clients' doubts or skepticism.
Agency costs will thus predictably be higher because the attorney has less
incentive to minimize them and the class members generally cannot.
To be sure, this does not mean that agency costs are entirely uncon-
strained. The court plays a monitoring role, and competition is likely
among multiple counsel seeking to be named class counsel. Hence, prior
success and reputation remain relevant factors in the selection of class
counsel, but so also may other factors, including pay-to-play contribu-
21. Technically, there is only a right to opt out (that is, to exclude oneself from the
class so that the action's resolution is not binding on such person) in the case of class
actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Although a class
certified instead under Rule 23(b) (1) or (b) (2) does not confer a right to opt out, some
decisions have suggested that the right to opt out may be constitutionally required when
class members have substantial monetary claims. See Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937,
950-53 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing mandatory class certification under Rule 23(b) (2)
because failure to provide notice or opportunity to opt out denied due process); In re
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 873-74, 881-82 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding due
process requires right to opt out of class "[w]here defendants have sufficient funds to
compensate class members through individual litigation").
22. Just how powerless even the class representatives can be is revealed by Lazy Oil Co.
v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 589-91 (3d Cir. 1999) (approving class action settlement and
refusing to disqualify class counsel despite objections from lead plaintiff and other major
class members). There, three of the four class representatives who had brought an
antitrust class action became dissatisfied with the class counsel and its proposed settlement.
Id. at 583. These class representatives were sophisticated oil companies who had originally
planned the action. In addition, some 384 class members also opposed the settlement and
filed objections. Id. at 584. Nonetheless, the district court and the Third Circuit permitted
the case to be settled over their objections. Id. at 589-91. The lesson here is simple: Both
courts and class counsel often have strong incentives to favor settlements, even when they
are on terms that are unsatisfactory to sophisticated class members. For a similar view that
the representative plaintiff has little role or impact, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids
in Class Action Settlements, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 633, 634 n.2 (2003) (citing other sources
that discuss minimal role or impact of representative plaintiff).
Although class members may object to the attorneys' fee awarded by the court, the fee
award is a matter for judicial decision and discretion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) (governing
procedures for attorney fee awards and requiring judicial approval). The removal of class
counsel is also at the discretion of the court, and even the lead plaintiff in securities
litigation does not have the power to remove class counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g).
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tions.2 3 More importantly, whatever the fee formula officially used, the
empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that the class attorney's fee will
be a direct function of the size of the recovery obtained for the class; the
bigger the recovery, the higher the fee.24 Thus, the class attorney has a
strong incentive to maximize the recovery. But this does not imply that
the interests of class members are well aligned, either with each other or
with their attorney.25
A. A Typology of Aggregate Litigation Models
The fact that the clients do not choose or control their attorney in
class and representative litigation under the normal U.S. rules of litiga-
tion governance has proven a sticking point for other legal systems, which
have so far largely declined to adopt U.S.-style class action procedures.
From a comparative perspective, one can categorize existing approaches
for organizing large-scale aggregate litigation as falling into one of the
following five models.
1. The Opt-Out Class. - The critical idea underlying the opt-out class
action is that one affected individual should be able to bring an action on
behalf of (and that will bind) all similarly situated persons whose rights
have been allegedly infringed by the defendant's same conduct. Breath-
taking in scope, this unique governance rule is usually justified as neces-
sary to solve collective action problems that render small claimants ration-
ally apathetic. But it also confers enormous leverage on the class counsel.
Effectively, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows this
attorney, often using only a nominal client, to file an action that sets forth
its own proposed definition of the class of persons who will be bound by
it; then, it is up to the proposed class members to flee the class by opting
23. A debate continues over the significance of pay-to-play. A recent investigation by
the New York Daily News found that lawyers representing the State of New York received
over $518 million in fee awards in class action cases over the last ten years and that the last
three New York State Controllers had received over $1 million in political contributions
from plaintiffs' law firms. See Kenneth Lovett, Pension Pay-To-Play: Law Firms Gave
Controllers Big Bucks, Then Got $518M in Fees from State Fund, N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 8,
2009. Others believe that the impact of pay-to-play has been overstated. See David H.
Webber, Is Pay-to-Play Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions?:
An Empirical Study 2 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 09-28, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1432497) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Nonetheless, when political contributions are made to state and municipal comptrollers by
lawyers in a remote jurisdiction (as they often are), it is hard to imagine any plausible
explanation other than a desire to influence the future selection of class counsel.
24. For the fullest empirical study demonstrating this point, see Theodore Eisenberg
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. 27, 28 (2004) (arguing size of fund is best predictor of fee,
regardless of fee formula used).
25. I have surveyed the range of conflicts that can arise between class counsel and
class members elsewhere. SeeJohn C. Coffee,Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling




out. The practical ability of the plaintiffs attorney to aggregate claims
pursuant to Rule 23 is, however, subject to two important limitations: (1)
certain due process minima must be observed;2 6 and (2) if the action
primarily seeks money damages, the class must be defined so that com-
mon issues of law and fact "predominate" over the individual issues.27
This predominance requirement enables courts to exercise considerable
discretion in determining what causes of action are suitable on their facts
for class-wide determination. Other prerequisites for class certification
exist, but only two are likely to have any "real world" impact: (1) the class
representative must be found "adequate" to represent the class,28 and (2)
the class representative must hold claims "typical" of those held by the
class. 29 All told, these latter criteria are fairly minimal tests of class cohe-
sion, and as a result Rule 23 effectively enables the plaintiffs attorney to
file a class action covering potentially millions of class members, based
only on the consent of a single class member with a nominal interest.
Nonetheless, the tide may be turning. Over the last decade, U.S.
courts have proven increasingly reluctant to certify sprawling class ac-
tions, steadily rejecting more and more proposed classes based on the
predominance standard of Rule 23(b) (3).3o Still, in some areas, such as
securities litigation, the common issues typically continue to be found to
predominate over the individual issues,3 1 and so large class actions assert-
ing multibillion dollar claims remain common in the securities context.
26. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816-23 (1999) (holding that
applying Kansas law to all claims was unconstitutional because Kansas lacked interest in
claims unrelated to itself and conflict of law existed between Kansas and other states).
27. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). In recent years, the federal courts have tightened
class certification requirements substantially, principally by interpreting this predominance
standard more rigorously. For a review of these decisions, seeJohn C. Coffee,Jr. & Daniel
Wolf, Class Certification: Developments over the Last Five Years 2004-2009, 10 Class
Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 13, 2009).
28. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4). The adequacy-of-representation requirement looks
to both "(1) whether any substantial conflicts of interest exist between the representatives
and the class; and (2) whether the representatives will adequately prosecute the action."
See Busby v.JRHBW Realty, Inc., 513 F.3d 1314, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008) (reversing denial of
class certification and assessing standards for certification under Rule 23).
29. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3). Typicality is satisfied "when each class member's claim
arises from the same course of events, and each class member makes similar legal
arguments to prove the defendant's liability." Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.,
267 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing denial of class certification and analyzing
standards under Rule 23).
30. For example, in tort cases, proximate causation is typically found to be an
individual issue that prevents a finding of predominance; in fraud cases, the victim's
reliance on the alleged misrepresentation is similarly an individual issue (except as
explained in the next footnote), and in contract cases when laws of multiple states apply,
this variation in law is also an individual legal issue. See Coffee & Wolf, supra note 27, at
195-218 (reviewing recent decisions rejecting class certification for failure to satisfy
predominance standard).
31. In large part, this is because the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson adopted
the "fraud on the market" doctrine, which eliminated any need for the class members to
show individual reliance on the material misstatement or omission in cases where the
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In securities class actions, an additional important governance rule
applies: A rebuttable presumption was created by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) that the class member with the
largest stake in the action who volunteers to serve as the class representa-
tive should be preferred over other proposed representatives with smaller
stakes.3 2 The class representative so selected (termed the "lead plaintiff'
by the PSLRA) then chooses the class counsel.3 3 In effect, this approach
substitutes the economic self-interest of the lead plaintiff for a democratic
selection process-based on the obvious logic that few class members will
exercise any right to vote or express themselves.
2. The Non-Opt-Out Class. - In the United States, the principal alter-
native to the opt-out class action accords even fewer rights to class mem-
bers. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a plaintiff
to seek injunctive or equitable relief or to assert claims with respect to a
"limited fund," without according fellow class members any right to opt
out.34 The rationale here is that separate actions might lead to inconsis-
tent results or might allow a plaintiff who opted out an opportunity to
seize the limited fund, thereby depriving the others. Yet, despite this nar-
row rationale for the non-opt-out class, non-opt-out class actions may in
security traded in an efficient market. 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988). Because reliance would
have been an "individual" issue, the need to prove reliance by each class member would
have precluded a finding of predominance under Rule 23(b) (3). Id. at 229-30; see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
32. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub, L. No. 104-67, § 101(b),
109 Stat. 737, 743-44 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006))
(amending Section 21D of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to create presumption in favor
of person seeking appointment who "in the determination of the court, has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class").
33. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v)). This selection is,
however, made expressly "subject to the approval of the court," which must satisfy itself as
to the adequacy of representation standard under Rule 23(a) (4), both with respect to the
class representative and the class counsel. Id.
34. By their terms, Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) do not require either notice or a
right to opt out. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1)-(2). Rule 23(b) (1) authorizes a mandatory non-
opt-out class action, usually relating to a "limited fund." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). A
limited fund is essentially a fund that will be inadequate to satisfy the claims of all
claimants. Such a limited fund may arise either when the litigation is over a specific asset
(for example, a Rembrandt claimed by various heirs to a decedent), or when the
defendant's funds are inadequate to pay all claimants. In such instances, any individual
recovery in a separate action might frustrate the class action by depleting the assets
available, and hence Rule 23(b)(1)(B) authorizes a mandatory class from which class
members may not opt out.
In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Supreme Court insisted upon a narrow definition of
"limited fund," restricting the reach of Rule 23(b) (1) (B) to cases where the "totals of the
aggregate liquidated claims and the fund available for satisfying them, set definitely at their
maximums, demonstrate the inadequacy of the fund to pay all the claims." 527 U.S. 815,
838 (1999). Much more frequently used than Rule 23(b)(1) is Rule 23(b)(2), which
authorizes a class action seeking predominantly equitable or injunctive relief. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(2). Traditionally, only "incidental" money damages could be sought under this
provision, but the circuit courts are now clearly split over the meaning of incidental money
damages, as explained infra note 35.
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some circuits also assert claims for sizable monetary damages, so long as
the action purports to primarily seek injunctive relief.3 5 Effectively, this
rule may enable the class attorney who is truly seeking money damages to
outflank the normal class member's right to opt out.3 6
3. The Opt-In Class Action. - The polar opposite to the opt-out class
action is the opt-in model, under which each claimant must take some
positive step to join the collective proceeding. The opt-in model appears
to be the dominant approach in Europe.3 7 In contrast, in the United
States, the opt-in class action has been held to be unavailable. 3 8 In a lead-
ing case in which the district court had sought to fashion an opt-in class
because no other procedure was available, the Second Circuit still re-
jected this attempt, finding that an opt-in class was simply not permitted
by Rule 23.3
35. Both the Second and the Ninth Circuits have allowed class actions to seek
compensatory damages under an "ad hoc balancing" test where "the positive weight or
value [to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive or declaratory relief sought is predominant even
though compensatory or punitive damages are also claimed." Robinson v. Metro-North
Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 430 (5th Cir. 1998) (Dennis,J., dissenting)); see also Molski v. Gleich,
318 F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In order to determine predominance, we have focused
on the language of Rule 23(b) (2) and the intent of the plaintiffs in bringing the suit.").
Robinson's broad test for when compensatory relief can be obtained under Rule 23(b) (2)
looks to whether "(1) even in the absence of a possible monetary recovery, reasonable
plaintiffs would bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief sought; and (2)
the injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both reasonably necessary and
appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed on the merits." Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164.
A number of other circuits have rejected this broad reading of Rule 23(b) (2) and
permitted under it only the recovery of damages easily computed pursuant to a formula or
statutory penalty. See Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001) (denying
class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) because nonincidental damages were sought);
Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897-98 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); Allison, 151
F.3d at 415-16 (same).
36. For example, the Ninth Circuit has upheld class certification in Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc granted, 556 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2009),
even though the panel noted that the compensatory damages sought by the plaintiffs "may
amount to billions of dollars." Id. at 1186. Even if Dukes is reversed on rehearing, a
considerable conflict remains among the circuits over the scope of Rule 23(b) (2).
37. See Hodges, supra note 10, at 119 ("The model that has been adopted in most EU
jurisdictions for court-based rules is that claimants must take a positive step to assert their
rights and formally join a coordinated procedure (opt-in)."). This study lists England,
Sweden, Germany, and Italy as normally following this position, but notes that Portugal has
adopted an opt-out procedure. See also Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 12, at 192 (also
noting that Europe has resisted the opt-out class).
38. See Kern ex rel. Estate of Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 124-26 (2d Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1034 (2005) (reversing class certification of opt-in class
consisting of heirs, beneficiaries, and personal representatives of victims who died in ski
train fire in Austria where district court had limited class to those who consented to be
bound by any judgment).
39. Id. at 124 ("Not only is an 'opt-in' provision not required, but substantial legal
authority supports the view that by adding the 'opt-out' requirement to Rule 23 in the 1966
amendments, Congress prohibited 'opt-in' provisions by implication."); see also Clark v.
Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 340 (7th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he requirement of an
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In contrast to the coolness shown by U.S. courts to the concept of
the opt-in class action, Europe has been reluctant to accept any collective
litigation remedy that does not require individual consent by class mem-
bers. In 2008, the European Commission published both a White Paper
on antitrust enforcement, which, after considering a variety of options,
favored the opt-in class action over the procedure, 4 0 and a Green Paper
on consumer collective redress, which similarly contemplated an ap-
proach less sweeping than the American class action.41 The principal ob-
jection in Europe to the opt-out class is the perception that it invites
abuse by giving a positive settlement value to nonmeritorious actions that
the defendant is compelled to settle, either because of high litigation
costs of defense or the prospect, even if remote, of a recovery that would
bankrupt the defendant.
4. Representative Actions. - To date, actual experience with either
opt-out or opt-in class actions in Europe is limited. But Europe has con-
siderable experience with representative actions brought by special enti-
ties, such as ombudsmen, 42 private consumer organizations, or other
nonprofit associations that seek to enforce particular statutes on behalf of
consumers or others.43 Traditionally, these actions were limited to in-
junctive relief, but the European Commission's 2008 White Paper on an-
titrust enforcement contemplated that representative actions by associa-
tions should be permitted for money damages for competition law
violations as well. 4 4 Indeed, the White Paper proposed that the associa-
affirmative request for inclusion in the class is contrary to the express language of Rule
23(c)(2)(B) . . . .").
40. See Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules, at 4, COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008) [hereinafter White Paper]. Under the
European Commission's practice, a White Paper is a follow-up document to an earlier
Green Paper that outlines possible options. Thus, a Green Paper is a discussion document
intended to stimulate debate and elicit specific proposals, whereas a white paper is an
official set of proposals that is intended to lead to legislation. An earlier Green Paper on
antitrust enforcement was published by the European Commission in 2005, which was then
followed in 2008 by the above-noted white paper. See Commission Green Paper on
Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final (Dec. 19,
2005). For a general discussion of the White Paper and the earlier Green Paper, see
Hodges, supra note 10, at 170-81. For a critical review of the EC's decision to prefer the
opt-in model to the American opt-out version, see Robert Gaudet,Jr., Turning a Blind Eye:
The Commission's Rejection of Opt-Out Class Actions Overlooks Swedish, Norwegian,
Danish and Dutch Experience, 30 Eur. Competition L. Rev. 107, 107 (2009) ("Because the
opt-out mechanism provides the greatest compensation to the most victims ... [it] is vastly
preferable to the opt-in mechanism . . . .").
41. Commission Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM (2008) 794 final
(Nov. 27, 2008).
42. Hodges finds the consumer ombudsmen to be the "most developed public system
to date" in Europe. Hodges, supra note 10, at 228.
43. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 12, at 192 (noting European "tendency to
allow only organizations to represent consumers in class action cases").
44. The White Paper appears to contemplate that damages would be awarded to the
association for injury to its members, and that individuals would sue separately on an opt-in
basis. White Paper, supra note 40, at 4.
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tional actions be viewed as a complementary procedure to the opt-in class
action, with both being brought side-by-side in many cases. Its justifica-
tion for such an integrated approach was that a preexisting association
would be a more adequate representative than any individual litigant
(particularly in cases where the monetary recovery might be marginal)
because it would be incentivized by its organizational mission, member-
ship support, and diminished fear of retaliation. 4 5 Logically, such as-
sociations would have standing to recover damages only to the extent of
their members' losses, but they could be authorized by statute to sue
more generally for all losses caused, or gains received, by the defendant,
with the excess over their members' losses being held in escrow for
claimants. 46
Funding for actions by associations comes today from a variety of
sources: state subsidies (for ombudsmen), contributions by trade groups,
or dues paid by members of a consumer group. Because of Europe's
"loser pays" rule, the association can at least anticipate recovering its legal
expenses if it is successful. On balance, the representative action makes
sense as a complement to class litigation precisely because it supplies a
functional analogue to the lead plaintiff in U.S. securities litigation:
namely, an organization with size and credibility that is potentially capa-
ble of monitoring class counsel.
5. Public Interest Litigation. - Although the United States has little
experience with associations suing for damages on behalf of their mem-
bers, it is very familiar with a functionally similar pattern: litigation
brought by nonprofit organizations that seek to assert or defend political
or ideological positions on behalf of their members (and only inciden-
tally and occasionally pursue monetary damages). Doctrinally, the
Supreme Court has accepted "representational standing," recognizing
that an organization can sue to protect its members' interests so long as
(1) a member or members of the organization would have standing to
sue in their own right; (2) "the interests it seeks to protect are germane to
the organization's purpose"; and (3) "neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit." 4 7 Although these organizational plaintiffs-of which the ACLU,
45. In a staff report accompanying the White Paper, the staff argued that associations
would sue when individuals would not, because they were better prepared to accept the
administrative burdens and did not need to fear alienating a business partner. See
Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, at 19-20, COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008).
46. Some European nations already have this procedure. Spain permits consumer
organizations to sue on behalf of both their members and unidentified victims. See Laurel
J. Harbour & Marc E. Shelley, The Emerging European Class Action: Expanding Multi-
Party Litigation to a Shrinking World, Prac. Litigator, July 2007, at 23, 28.
47. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); see also
UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (reaffirming Hunt principles and noting "[t]he
very forces that cause individuals to band together in an association will thus provide some
guarantee that the association will work to promote their interests").
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the Legal Defense Fund, and the Sierra Club are among the most promi-
nent examples-usually, themselves, seek only injunctive or equitable re-
lief, they may pursue money damages by acting as counsel to individuals
in class actions.48 Either way, their goal is usually less to obtain compen-
sation for their clients or members than to advance legal positions in pur-
suit of long-term political or ideological goals. Because their funding
comes from their members, such organizations may face a tension be-
tween their clients' interests and those of the contributors who fund
them.4 9 Hence, issues of accountability surface in this context as well.
B. A Preliminary Evaluation
If the only policy goal were to find a means to litigate negative value
claims with maximum impact, then the superiority of the opt-out class
action would seem obvious. But the policy goal cannot be defined this
simply. From a compensatory perspective, the fact that the opt-out class
aggregates all the claims relating to a common set of facts and legal theo-
ries does not mean that these claimants receive compensation when the
action settles. As will be seen, the same apathy that confounds the opt-in
class action at the outset also arises at the back end of the opt-out class
action when claims must be filed. As a result, neither action may succeed
at effectively distributing compensation. From a deterrence perspective,
the opt-out class action certainly better deters than the opt-in, but it may
produce overkill: Namely, it aggregates so many claims that defendants
cannot risk a trial on the merits, at least when there is a moderate risk (as
there usually is) that plaintiffs will prevail. This too may make the merits
of the litigation irrelevant and thereby distort outcomes in a manner that
can be thought unjust. If we want the playing field in aggregate litigation
to be more or less level so that cases are decided on their merits, then
public policy may need to recognize that some optimum level of claim
aggregation exists that is between all and none.
The case for an opt-in class is vulnerable, however, to the extent that
holders of negative value claims can be expected to remain apathetic,
with the result that only limited claim aggregation will occur. If so, the
action will be underfunded. But the more pertinent question is not
48. For example, in the earlier discussed case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., the action was
litigated by a combination of public interest firms and a traditional entrepreneurial
plaintiffs' law firm. 509 F.3d 1168, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2007).
49. These tensions can arise even in the standard context of a school desegregation
case in which the NAACP may be representing the plaintiff schoolchildren and parents.
For a candid discussion of these tensions, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470,
505-11 (1976) (arguing for courts to be sensitive to disagreements in black communities
over the type of school relief). For the fullest assessment of how these conflicts
surrounding public interest litigation might be resolved, see William B. Rubenstein,
Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil




whether opt-in class actions can aggregate a similar level of claims to opt-
out class actions (obviously, they cannot), but whether they can aggregate
a sufficient level to be economically viable. Here, it is dangerous to jump
from empirical data showing that opt-out levels are very low (around
0.2% in one study5 0 ) to the conclusion that opt-in levels will be similarly
insignificant. The difference in context is important, because opting in is
generally rational and opting out (at least in the case of negative value
claims) is generally irrational. As discussed shortly, some European ex-
periences suggest that an aggregate proceeding with a sufficiently credi-
ble leadership can attract a significant percentage of eligible claimants to
opt in.5 1
Equally important, the opt-in class need not stand alone, but could
be integrated with a representative action on behalf of consumers or
other injured claimants, as the European Commission's White Paper re-
cently proposed.5 2 Were the eligible claimants to be solicited by a credi-
ble not-for-profit organization, particularly one possessing significant
reputational capital-the equivalent, for example, of the Sierra Club in
an environmental action-such a marketing effort might be sufficient to
overcome the rational apathy or skepticism of litigation of many small
claimants. In fact, the United States has often seen functionally similar
unions, as "public interest" lawyers have linked arms with entrepreneurial
counsel to litigate major cases.5 3 Although Europe has already seen some
similar alliances struck between nonprofit groups and opt-in class mem-
bers, the financing of such litigation remains problematic.
Finally, changes in technology also make the opt-in class more feasi-
ble than in the past. Today, class counsel can solicit potential class mem-
bers to opt in through websites, emails, and electronic media. These
techniques appear to be effective, and their cost is low. 5 4
50. For this figure of 0.2% (or two in a thousand), see Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation:
Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1532 (2004) [hereinafter
Eisenberg & Miller, Opt-Outs] (basing figure on sample consisting of several thousand
class actions between 1993 and 2003).
51. See infra notes 127-136 and accompanying text (discussing several cases where
significant proportions of qualified individuals opted in).
52. See White Paper, supra note 40, at 4 (arguing for necessity of opt-in class actions
and representative actions complementing each other).
53. For example, in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., the plaintiffs in this much-noted
employment discrimination case were represented by several public interest firms (The
Impact Fund, Equal Rights Advocates, Public Justice Center) and by a traditional class
action plaintiffs' firm, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll. 509 F.3d at 1173-74. In the
United States, however, there is little practical need for the representative plaintiff to
possess high reputational capital because in opt-out class actions no reason exists either to
solicit the entire class or to engage in other marketing activity in order to obtain universal
inclusion of class members. To the extent that any marketing is done, it is largely focused
on assembling a coalition of would-be lead plaintiffs with an aggregate ownership greater
than that of rival coalitions.
54. These techniques are used today in cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, which provides a mandatory opt-in procedure in wage and hour cases. See 29 U.S.C.
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At present, Europe seems to be seeking to establish a stronger, bet-
ter-financed system of opt-in class litigation led by consumer and other
nonprofit organizations, while the United States continues to downsize its
opt-out class action by rigorously applying its predominance standard. If
both trends continue, the result could be functional convergence without
doctrinal convergence. Neither side would agree on a common doctrinal
position, but aggregate litigation might begin to look increasingly similar
on both sides of the Atlantic.
More importantly, if a policy goal is fairer, more balanced litigation
(and not simply maximum claim aggregation), so that neither plaintiffs
nor defendants are precluded from going to trial by economic factors
unrelated to the merits of the litigation, then such convergence seems
attractive. One might sensibly pursue it by one or both of two alternative
means: (1) one could seek to simplify and encourage the aggregation of
claims in opt-in class actions; or (2) one could seek to downsize the opt-
out class action by making opting out more attractive. The first alterna-
tive is probably feasible today only outside the United States, while the
second alternative is already in progress within the United States, as the
next Part will discuss. Neither route need be exclusive.
II. A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE: EXIT VERSUS VOICE
A. Exit and Voice Compared
From a governance perspective, a class action is an organization,
often with thousands of members, that persists for an indefinite period,
usually several years from the case's filing to its resolution. Over that pe-
riod, critical issues-class definition, settlement proposals, and the fee
award-arise where the interests of the class and its agents are likely to
diverge. Similarly, the class itself may have internal divisions, both be-
cause different class members may hold claims of differing strength or
value and because they may have different attitudes toward risk.5 5
From a traditional legal perspective, the court-awarded attorney's fee
is the principal lever by which the law seeks to incentivize the agent to act
in the class's interest. Few doubt that this is a powerful tool, which can be
adjusted upwards or downwards by the court to reflect the risk assumed
and the results achieved, but few believe that it is alone adequate.5 6 Even
§ 216(b) (2006) (specifying opt-in procedure); infra notes 138-145 and accompanying
text.
55. This is a less-recognized reason why institutional investors may sometimes want
the position of lead plaintiff. The longer the class period is defined to be, the more
vulnerable it becomes to attack by defendants. Yet, a prominent institutional investor
serving as lead plaintiff may insist that the class period's definition be stretched far enough
to cover most or all of its losses. Its self-interest here may be in conflict with that of other
class members.
56. For one of the best treatments of the complex issues in fee award decisions and
the limitations on the use of this policy lever, seeJohn Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor
in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale L.J. 473, 481 (1981). For the fullest recent judicial
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if the adjustable fee can motivate, many cases reach the point at which
the attorney has invested sufficient time and money in the action that the
attorney is compelled to settle it, even on terms that may be unsatisfactory
to most of the class.5 7 For example, an attorney may simply be unable to
finance the case any further and hence offers or accepts a settlement that
benefits the attorney, but not the class. For a time, class action settle-
ments for "coupons only" became notorious, until Congress severely re-
stricted their use in the Class Action Fairness Act.58 Although it can be
reasonably debated whether such collusive settlements that benefit the
plaintiffs counsel at the expense of the class are truly the product of the
plaintiffs attorney's financial exhaustion, they certainly show that the in-
terests of the class and its attorney are far from well aligned. Congress
has now discouraged the "coupon" settlement, but it has not diminished
the forces that produce collusion. The simple reality is that the class ac-
tion attorney in the United States funds the litigation's costs for a multi-
year period and expects to receive a fee, if successful, that is likely to be
between ten and thirty percent of the recovery.59 As a result, the attorney
has much more at stake than any class member. Hence, the attorney is
more likely to be risk averse and to prefer settlement to trial. In contrast,
behavioral research suggests that the less the small claimant has at stake,
the more the claimant is likely to prefer to gamble on trial and a large
examination of the standards for attorney fee awards, see In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
57. This is particularly true in mega-class actions, which may settle for amounts over
$100 million. Because U.S. courts typically award fees on a declining percentage of the
recovery, a point may often be reached after which increasing the settlement's size
produces less and less benefit to the plaintiffs attorney. At this point, class counsel's self-
interest will increasingly favor settlement.
58. Coupon settlements are settlements in which class members are compensated
with coupons giving them discounts off the price of products or services, rather than
monetary awards. For an example of their misuse, see In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 780, 819-22 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting
proposed settlement consisting of nontransferrable coupons entitling recipient to $1,000
discount on purchase of truck). The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2,
119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), restricted the use of coupons in
settlements by a variety of means, but chiefly by instructing courts to award attorneys' fees
to class counsel based only on the coupons redeemed by the class, not the coupons
distributed to the class. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2006).
59. For an identical assessment (including the estimate that the fee award will be
between ten and thirty percent), see Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 12, at 186. During
the early-to-mid 1990s, the standard fee award in securities class actions was higher and
averaged thirty-two percent of the settlement. See Frederick C. Dunbar, et al., Nat'l Econ.
Research Assocs., Recent Trends III: What Explains Settlements in Shareholder Class
Actions 7 (1995). For a later study updating these results and also finding the average fee
award to be thirty-two percent of the settlement, see Denise M. Martin et al., Recent Trends
IV: What Explains Filings and Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions, 5 Stan. J.L. Bus. &
Fin. 121, 141 (1999). More recently, the percentage fee has declined as settlements have
soared over the billion dollar mark, reflecting the tendency for courts to follow a
"declining percentage of the recovery" fee formula. See In re Enron Corp., 586 F. Supp. 2d
at 774-75 (collecting recent studies).
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recovery.6 0 In short, the principal and agent in class litigation are natu-
rally likely to differ in their risk preferences.
This and other recurrent divergence between the interests of the
agent and the principal suggest that the legal system cannot pin all its
hopes on the attorneys' fee award as the optimal incentive device. What
alternatives, then, remain? Organizational theorists have long grouped
organizational remedies under two basic headings: voice and exit.6 1
Voice-based remedies focus on participation in the group's decisionmak-
ing, and thus they may give voting rights to the organization's members,
or at least notice and an opportunity to be heard in court on critical
decisions.6 2 The "lead plaintiff' in securities class actions is a prototypical
voice-based reform, which uses the plaintiff with the largest stake in the
action as the vicarious voice of all class members to monitor the class
attorney.
Exit-based remedies instead allow the individual to escape the group.
Although they have been less frequently discussed in the litigation con-
text,6 3 they are well known to corporate governance. Opting out is the
paradigmatic exit remedy, but procedural scholars have objected to pro-
posals for the enhanced use of opting out, arguing that "practically speak-
ing, opting out simply removes the class member from the debate."64
This response misses the forest for the trees by assuming that the class
action should be run as if it were a small democratic community, like
some New England town meeting. In contrast, corporate governance
scholars recognize that when dissatisfied shareholders sell their shares,
their collective exit will drive down the market price of the stock, thereby
60. Social scientists have coined the term "peanuts effect" to refer to the
demonstrated tendency of small claimants to exhibit risk-seeking behavior. See BethanyJ.
Weber & Gretchen B. Chapman, Playing for Peanuts: Why Is Risk Seeking More Common
for Low-Stakes Gambles?, 97 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 31, 31-32
(2005) ("[D]ecision-makers are more willing to take risks when playing for 'peanuts."').
On this basis, the plaintiffs attorney and negative value claimants may have interests that
are often poorly aligned. For a fuller discussion of the peanuts effect and a criticism of the
PSLRA's preference for the largest stakeholder in light of it, see Gousgounis, supra note
10, at 16-19.
61. For the origin of these terms, see Hirschman, supra note 11, at 3-5 (defining
terms and identifying them as two mechanisms through which managers are alerted to
firm's poor performance).
62. Civil procedure scholars have recurrently suggested reforms of class action
practices that seek to improve or enhance the "voice" of class members. See, e.g., Patrick
Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 571, 604
(1997) (proposing greater rights for class members to participate in litigation decisions).
63. Some academics have discussed expanded "exit" options as a corrective for class
action abuses. See Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement:
Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1155, 1193 (1998) (proposing
requirement of individual consent in class action settlements).
64. Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 Ind. L.
Rev. 65, 82 (2003).
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desirably disciplining management.6 5 In the litigation context, when
class members opt out, they thereby reduce the total number of claims
aggregated in the class action and hence the settlement value of the case.
Because fee awards are a function of settlement size, this in turn reduces
the likely fee award to class counsel.
Traditionally, dissatisfied shareholders who sold their shares were
said to be following the "Wall Street Rule" by preferring exit to voice and
avoiding any direct challenge to management. More recently, with the
increasing institutionalization of share ownership, voice has become the
more popular remedy, and groups of institutional investors frequently en-
gage in dialogues with corporate management that effectively pressure or
induce management to change plans and strategies. Still, even if voice-
based reforms are becoming more popular in the world of corporate gov-
ernance, there are compelling reasons why exit may be the more power-
ful tool in litigation governance. In the corporate context, when a dissat-
isfied shareholder sells shares, the shareholder does not withdraw capital
from the corporation. Instead, the shareholder simply transfers existing
shares to another party without forcing the corporation to return the cap-
ital received for those shares on their issuance; thus, the only impact is on
the share price in the secondary market. In the litigation context, how-
ever, the class member who opts out reduces the aggregate claims repre-
sented by the class attorney, thereby reducing both the attorney's lever-
age against the defendants and the attorney's likely fee award. This
impact is more direct, immediate, and painful. In addition, the class
member who opts out may seek representation from a different attorney
by filing an individual action or joining a consolidated action with other
former class members. This set of choices induces competition, which
can also discipline the class attorney. These two factors-a reduced fee
award and the prospect of competition-imply, at least in theory, that
exit may outperform voice in the world of litigation governance. As the
following section demonstrates, this theory is borne out by the recent
evidence.
B. The Trend Toward Exit
If exit should outperform voice in theory, empirical corroboration of
this prediction had long been lacking until recent developments. The
rate of opt-outs in class actions has been low, around 0.2% in one well-
known study.66 The likely explanation for this low rate is that the mem-
bership of most classes is predominantly populated by small claimants,
who have no reason to opt out because they hold negative value claims.
But there is at least one context where this generalization that class mem-
65. For the view that this is an effective remedy in corporate governance, see Alex
Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64J. Fin. 2481,
2482-84 (2009).




bers hold small claims is not valid: securities class actions. Over recent
decades, the ownership of securities has shifted from retail investors to
institutional investors.6 7 The latter tend to be indexed investors, holding
sizable stakes in most public companies. Hence, if an institutional inves-
tor owned just one percent or more of the securities purchased during
the class period, it would typically have a sizable loss that could justify
individual litigation. But until recently, even these investors did not opt
out. Why not? The most logical explanation is that they had little inter-
est in, or knowledge about, securities litigation, or saw no viable alterna-
tive to the class action.
The strongest evidence of this apathy emerges in recent surveys that
have found that institutional investors often did not even claim their
share of securities class action settlements, failing to take as simple a step
as filing a claim form after the settlement funds had been deposited.6 8
This may represent irrational apathy, but such behavior probably re-
flected investment managers' lack of experience with legal proceedings
(and even a likely disdain for them). Because the typical securities class
action settles for only a modest percentage of the investors' losses (often
between only two and three percent69 ), investment managers likely ig-
nored such immaterial recoveries, believing that they did not justify their
investment of time and effort. Also, investment managers simply did not
know plaintiffs' attorneys and may have regarded them as cynical swin-
dlers (as defense attorneys often portray them).
But the passage of the PSLRA in 1995 ended this social isolation, at
least in the case of public pension funds. As public pension funds gradu-
ally accepted the role of lead plaintiff, they began to interact with, and to
be solicited by, the large plaintiffs' law firms. Concomitantly, "pay-to-
play" practices began to develop, because for the first time plaintiffs' law
67. For data showing that retail shareholders today own only about twenty-six percent
of the stock of public corporations, see J. Choper, J. Coffee & R. Gilson, Cases and
Materials on Corporations 15 (7th ed. 2008).
68. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your
Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions
to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 411, 413 (2005)
[hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Slip Through Your Fingers] ("[L]ess than thirty percent of
institutional investors with provable losses perfect their claims in [securities class action]
settlements."); see also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table:
Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 Wash. U. L.Q.
855, 879 (2002) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money] (discussing plausible reasons
for institutional investors failure to file claims).
69. According to the National Economic Research Associates, a consulting firm, the
ratio of securities class action settlements to investor economic losses in 2002, 2003, and
2004 was 2.7%, 2.9%, and 2.6%, respectively. See Elaine Buckberg, et al., Nat'l Econ.
Research Assocs., Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Are WorldCom
and Enron the New Standard? 6 (2005), available at http://www.nera.com/
Publication.asp?pID=2544&login=6923124 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The
highest percentage they found was 7.2% in 1996. Id. This ratio appears to be decreasing




firms saw a reason to make political contributions to officials who con-
trolled, or at least influenced, public pension funds. As competition for
the position of lead plaintiff developed, circumstances necessarily arose
in which one team of law firms and pension funds would be defeated by
another team of institutions that had assembled a larger block in the sub-
ject corporation. As a result, the losing plaintiffs' team faced a decision
that the PSLRA never envisioned: Should they accept defeat graciously
and remain in the class? Or, should they listen to their own attorneys and
opt out? Clearly, it was in the unsuccessful attorney's interest to solicit
clients to opt out, because otherwise that attorney would be unlikely to
receive any fee, even though the attorney may have already expended
substantial time on the action.
The response of institutional investors is now clear: They followed
their attorneys and opted out. Their motives are debatable. Some public
pension funds may have been influenced by "pay-to-play" political contri-
butions. Others may have simply followed the advice of counsel that-in
the wake of the PSLRA-they had come to know and respect. The irony
then is that although the PSLRA intended a voice-based reform, it fos-
tered relationships between institutional investors and plaintiffs' attor-
neys that supplied the preconditions for their reliance instead upon an
exit-based reform (i.e., opting out)-and on an unprecedented scale.
This trend toward increased opting out began in the wake of the
WorldCom litigation, and the ironic instigator of this revolt against tradi-
tional class action practices was the titular dean of the securities class ac-
tion bar, William Lerach. 70 After his firm lost the contest to become class
counsel in the WorldCom class action to the Bernstein, Litowitz firm
(largely because the New York State Pension Fund, represented by
Bernstein, Litowitz, held a very large position in WorldCom's bonds), Mr.
Lerach convinced some sixty-five investors to opt out of the WorldCom
action.7 1 Although the WorldCom class action eventually settled for $6.2
billion, at the time a record amount, the opt-outs appear to have done
much better than those who remained in the class.7 2
70. See Kevin LaCroix, Oakbridge Ins. Servs., Opt-Outs: A Worrisome Trend in
Securities Class Action Litigation, Insights, Apr. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.
oakbridgeins.com/newsletters/April_Opt-OutsAWorrisomeTrendinSecuritiesClassAction
Litigation.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter LaCroix, Worrisome
Trend] (discussing Lerach's ability to persuade investors to opt out of class settlements).
71. Id.
72. Three large California pension funds-CaPERS, CaISTRS, and the Los Angeles
County Employee Retirement System-announced in 2005 that they had settled their
actions for $257.4 million. Id. at 3. Five New York City pension funds similarly opted out
and settled their $130 million in claims for $78.9 million, and their counsel announced
that this settlement amounted to "three times more than they would have recovered if they
had joined the class." Id. For similar estimates, see Dave Lenckus, Individual Suits Likely
Over Subprime Losses; Some Investors Expected to Opt-Out of Class Actions, Business Ins.,
Nov. 19, 2007 (describing payouts for investors who opted out of settlements with AOL and
WorldCom).
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If the WorldCom litigation signaled to the institutional community
that they might do better by opting out, the case that truly proved this
thesis was the AOL Time Warner class action, which settled on a class
basis in 2006 for $2.4 billion-again a near-record settlement. This time,
Mr. Lerach convinced more than one hundred investors to pursue indi-
vidual opt-out actions.7 3 Based on a variety of press reports, these institu-
tional opt-outs did significantly better than if they had stayed in the class,
as shown by the following table:
TABLE 1: THE AOL TIME WARNER DIFFERENTIAL
Estimated Improvement over Share of
Opt-Out Settlement Class Recovery
University of California 7 4  $246 million 16-24 times better than class
Ohio Pension Funds7 5  $175 million $9 million (over 19 times better than class)
CalPERS7 6  $117.7 million 17 times better than class
CaISTRS7 7  $105 million 7 times better than class
State of Alaska Funds7 8  $50 million (on 80%+ recovery was "50 times better than
$60 million claim) class recovery"
Not only did the opt-outs do better, but they received recoveries that
sometimes approached their total claimed losses.79 Such recovery levels
73. See Josh Gerstein, Investors Opt Out of Time Warner Class Action Suit, N.Y. Sun,
Feb. 8, 2006, at 5, available at LexisNexis, NYSUN file (providing reasons for investors'
decision to opt out of settlements proceedings).
74. See Gilbert Chan, CaIPERS' Time Strategy Pays Off: The State Pension Fund Gets
$117.7 Million After Opting Out of Class Action Against Media Giant, Sacramento Bee,
Mar. 15, 2007, available at LexisNexis, MCTBUS file (describing settlement received by
opting out of class action); LaCroix, Worrisome Trend, supra note 70, at 2. Christopher
Patti, an in-house counsel for the University, provided the "16 to 24 times" estimate. Chan,
supra.
75. See Time Warner Settles Lawsuit for $144 Million, L.A. Times, Mar. 8, 2007, at C6
(quoting Ohio Attorney General Marc Dann that Ohio received $135 million more than it
would have received under the settlement). Ohio received a total of $175 million, because
its legal fees of $31 million were paid by Time Warner in addition to the $144 million it
received. Assuming that Ohio would have received only $9 million under the class action
(i.e., $144 million minus $135 million), this translates into better than a 19:1 disparity.
76. CalPERS's General Counsel described its settlement as "approximately 17 times
what we would have recovered if we stayed in the class," estimating that it would have
received roughly $6 million under the class action. See Chan, supra note 74 (quoting
Peter Mixon, CalPERS general counsel).
77. CalSTRS estimated that it would receive only $15 million under the class action.
Id.
78. Josh Gerstein, Time Warner Case Finds a Surprise, N.Y. Sun, Dec. 7, 2006, at 1,
available at LexisNexis, NYSUN file [hereinafter Gerstein, Surprise]; LaCroix, Worrisome
Trend, supra note 70, at 2.
79. For example, the State of Alaska settled its $60 million claim for $50 million and
said that it had received "50 times more than what we would have received if we had
remained in the class." Gerstein, Surprise, supra note 78, at 1; see also LaCroix,
Worrisome Trend, supra note 70, at 2. CalPERS claimed losses of approximately $129




(between eighty and ninety percent of losses in the cases of Alaska and
CalPERS) dwarf the typical two to three percent recovery rate in most
securities class actions (or the recovery levels in any other form of private
litigation).80
Conceivably, these estimates by pension funds of their relative suc-
cess through opting out may marginally overstate the degree to which
these institutions improved on their likely class recovery. This is because
their actual recovery necessarily depends on how many class members
ultimately file claims at the post-settlement stage at which funds are dis-
bursed. Thus, a CalPERS or a CalSTRS may represent five percent of the
class, but they could receive significantly more than five percent of the
recovery if other class members fail to file claims.81 Still, even if institu-
tional investors may receive a disproportionate share of the settlement if
other claimants do not file, they cannot by definition receive more than
the entire settlement fund. Thus, one incontrovertible measure of the
relative success of these opt-outs is that their total recovery has sometimes
exceeded the class recovery. The Qwest class action settled in 2005 for
$400 million,8 2 but Qwest has disclosed payments of $411 million to opt-
outs.8 3 Because most institutional investors have no obligation to disclose
80. For this estimate of the average recovery in securities class actions, see supra note
69.
81. Conceivably, if small claimants did not file, the institutional investors that did file
could receive 100% or more of their claims. For studies finding that even large claimants
often fail to file significant claims in a securities class action settlement, see Cox & Thomas,
Slip Through Your Fingers, supra note 68, at 412; see also Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money,
supra note 68, at 855, 870-78. Formerly, class action settlements often contained a
reversionary provision under which unclaimed amounts in the settlement fund reverted to
the defendant, but such reversionary settlements are now rare in securities class actions
because they have been discouraged by the PSLRA. See infra note 151. As a result, the
beneficiaries today of a low claims filing rate are the larger institutions that do file claims.
82. The stipulation of settlement was filed on November 23, 2005. See In re Qwest
Commc'ns Int'l Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 01-cv-01451-REB-CBS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71267, at
*8 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2006).
83. See Robert Elder, Retired Teachers System, Qwest Reach Settlement, Austin Am.
Statesman, Dec. 6, 2007, at D-1, available at LexisNexis, AUSTIN file (noting amount
received under class action settlement versus that received by opting out); see also Kevin
LaCroix, Opt-Outs, Claims Severity and D&O Insurance Limits, D&O Diary, Feb. 5, 2007,
at http://www.dandodiary.com/2007/02/articles/d-o-insurance/optouts-claims-severity-
and-d-o-insurance-limits/ [hereinafter LaCroix, Claims Severity] (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (discussing how class action settlement was only one of several settlements
Qwest has reached). In November, 2007, the Alaska Attorney General issued a press
release announcing that its state's various funds had settled their $89 million in claims in
the Qwest litigation for a net recovery (after attorneys' fees) of $19 million and that this
recovery contrasted with a payment of only $427,000 that they would have received under
the class settlement. See Press Release, Alaska Dep't of Law, Department of Law
Announces $19 Million Settlement in Securities Fraud Claims Against Qwest
Communications (Nov. 21, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This is roughly a
45:1 ratio. Similarly, the Teachers Retirement System of Texas announced a $61.6 million
net recovery and contrasted it with a $1.4 million payment that it would have received
under the class action settlement. Elder, supra, at D-1. This would be better than a 40:1
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their settlements with a defendant (and because the defendant has strong
reasons for insisting on confidentiality), it is possible that in earlier cases
(such as the AOL Time Warner litigation) the total opt-out recovery
might similarly have approached or exceeded the class recovery.
What will be the impact of increased opting out in securities class
actions? Clearly, everyone cannot opt out of the class because small retail
investors still hold negative value claims. As a matter of choice, some
large pension funds may decide to remain in the class to serve as lead
plaintiff (either because they wish to serve the public interest or because
of "pay-to-play" incentives). But the traditional heterogeneous class ac-
tion, comprised of large and small investors, could become less common;
indeed, the securities class action could become the vehicle of last resort
for only those smaller claimants who cannot economically afford to opt
out. Below some minimum level of damages, it becomes uneconomic for
a class member to opt out because its losses are too small to justify individ-
ual litigation. Where is this breakpoint? Today, some estimate that the
minimum losses necessary to make opting out viable may be as low as $10
million, 84 but it is too early to project confidently. As more institutions
and counsel experiment with individual litigation (and as competition
intensifies), this minimum damages level may fall further.
The larger question will be the impact of opt-outs on defendants.
Will they insist on settling the class action for a lower amount per claim-
ant because they expect to pay more to opt-outs? Although defendants
will certainly wish to reduce the class settlement, class counsel know that
any reduction in the per-claimant recovery will likely further motivate
those class members at the margin to opt out. Thus, class counsel have
increased reason to resist a weak settlement. Still, if the per-claimant re-
covery does fall as the result of increased opting out, then the gain to opt-
outs can be said to come at the expense of the smaller class members,
thereby complicating the issue of whether public policy should seek to
encourage opting out.
C. Why Do Opt-Outs Outperform the Class?
The pattern under which opt-outs seemingly receive a multiple of
the class recovery requires some causal explanation. A variety of legal
reasons can be offered as possible explanations: (1) opt-outs have certain
timing advantages and may be able to get to trial quicker;8 5 (2) opt-outs
ratio. CalSTRS settled for $46.5 million and announced that it was receiving "about 30
times more than it would have recovered if it had taken part in the class action." LaCroix,
Claims Severity, supra.
84. Stuart Grant, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., Comments as Panelist at American Bar
Association's Litigation Section Conference (May 2, 2009) (responding to question posed
by author who was moderator of securities litigation panel). Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. has
represented many institutional opt-outs in securities litigation.
85. If the opt-out plaintiff can obtain a trial date prior to the resolution of the class
action, it can virtually compel the defendants to settle with it on favorable terms. This is
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may sue in their own states and thereby gain a "home court" advantage;8 6
and (3) by suing in state court, opt-outs may be able to escape many of
the PSLRA restrictions that apply only to federal court actions.8 7 Finally,
by suing on an individual or consolidated basis, the opt-outs also escape
the increasingly complex issues surrounding class certification, which
have recently resulted in the denial of certification even in the case of
securities class actions.88
Still, although these reasons could explain why some class members
opt out, they have in fact almost nothing to do with the recent wave of
opt-outs in securities cases. In the cases just discussed, large numbers of
opt-outs departed the class, but only following the announcement of the
proposed class settlement. Those class members who opted out were ob-
viously dissatisfied with the proposed settlement and were not seeking to
because a favorable verdict at trial in the individual action may make it difficult or
impossible for the defendants to settle the class action on a cheaper per-claimant basis; in
contrast, a favorable settlement with the individual opt-out can be kept confidential and so
will not disrupt the class settlement. This fear that a successful plaintiffs' verdict in the opt-
out action could disrupt the class settlement has led federal courts to enjoin such an early
trial under the All Writs Act. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir.
1985) (permitting state trial to be enjoined under All Writs Act where it would disrupt
settlement negotiations before district court). More recently, the Second Circuit has
marginally curbed this power. See Ret. Sys. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d 419,
429-31 (2d Cir. 2004) (reversing injunction granted by federal district court against state
trial court where settlement was not clearly imminent).
86. By opting out, a state or municipal pension fund may be able to bring suit in state
court in its home jurisdiction and thereby escape the jurisdiction of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to assign all related cases to one federal district. See infra notes
94-95 and accompanying text. In the past, once so assigned, cases rarely escaped. A state
court may be a more attractive forum as local jurors may empathize more with the local
plaintiffs (for example, the local teacher or police pension fund), and plaintiffs' attorneys
may be able to elicit resentment against a distant corporate defendant.
87. The provisions of the PSLRA relating to pleading, discovery, and fee shifting are
set forth in Section 21D ("Private Securities Litigation") of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006). Section 21D applies only to a "private action . . . that is
brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.
§ 78u-4(a)(1). The principal exception to this generalization that opting out evades the
reach of federal courts' ability to halt or deny discovery is that the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) does authorize a federal court to stay discovery in a state
court "upon a proper showing," even in a nonclass action. Section 21D(b)(3)(D) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes a federal court as follows: "Upon a proper
showing, a court may stay discovery proceedings in any private action in a State court, as
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments, in an action
subject to a stay of discovery pursuant to this paragraph." Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(D). This
provision is less automatic than the PSLRA's stay, which requires no special showing.
88. See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,
266-70 (5th Cir. 2007) (requiring plaintiff to establish loss causation at class certification
stage by preponderance of all admissible evidence); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit
Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 385-90 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing class
certification for failure to satisfy prerequisites of "fraud on the market" doctrine and
adequate deceptive act); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir.
2006) (rejecting "some showing" standard and requiring district judge to make
determination that each Rule 23 requirement is met).
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gain timing or other tactical advantages, which they would have needed
to pursue at an earlier stage.
But why did these opt-outs think they could do better on their own,
having first waited to see what the class settlement would be? Here, three
reasons, each more economic than legal in nature, seem to explain their
decisions.
1. Insolvency Constraints. - A defendant's last resort when faced with
very high damages may be to threaten bankruptcy. This may cause class
counsel to moderate its demands, as plaintiff shareholders fare poorly in
a bankruptcy reorganization of their corporation. But this threat to file
bankruptcy is far less credible in the case of an individual action. An opt-
out action, or even a wave of them, simply does not represent sufficient
damages to induce a large corporation to file for bankruptcy. In contrast,
a "mega" securities class action in federal court may hypothetically seek
five billion dollars in damages, and the defendants' strongest argument
may truly be that the corporation simply cannot pay such an amount and
would file for bankruptcy before doing so. In this light, corporate de-
fendants are vulnerable to the tyranny of small decisions: They can deter
class counsel from making "unreasonable" demands, but not individual
opt-outs, because no individual opt-out believes that the decision will trig-
ger bankruptcy.
2. Agency Costs. - Opt-outs may do better because they face greatly
reduced agency costs. Most obviously, each opt-out selects its own coun-
sel and can monitor it closely, demanding at least as good a settlement as
the class and other opt-outs received. If unsatisfied, it can go to trial. An
absentee class member has no similar choice.
This is an inherent problem in the class action, because its disparate
members may have very different preferences, expectations, and esti-
mates. Even an ideally loyal class counsel cannot satisfy all their diverse
preferences. In an individual action, agency costs can be further reduced
by specially tailored compensation formulas for the attorney. In particu-
lar, the plaintiffs' attorney in a class action will likely be compensated on
the basis of a declining percentage of the recovery, which reduces the
incentive to hold out for a larger recovery. In contrast, the plaintiffs
attorney in the individual action can negotiate its fee with its clients, and
sometimes even an increasing percentage of the recovery formula may be
used.
3. Economic Leverage and Voting Power. - Institutional investors often
hold significant voting power. Suppose three large California pension
funds opt out together, holding collectively five percent of the firm's
stock. This voting power gives them leverage, as they can vote this stock
against management or potentially team up with a Carl Icahn-style insur-
gent to threaten management with a proxy fight. Thus, management has
reasons to placate them that do not apply to smaller shareholders, and
this leverage can translate into a higher settlement.
316 [Vol. 110:288
LITIGATION GOVERNANCE
More generally, the large-indexed institutional investor-such as a
CalPERS or a TLAA-CREF-is understood by management as a perma-
nent presence in their corporate governance that must be dealt with.
Knowing that they will have to negotiate with and solicit such a share-
holder recurrently in the future on voting and governance matters, the
corporation has more reason to placate such a shareholder. As a result,
litigation often need not even be commenced before a settlement is
reached.
4. Evaluation. - The foregoing analysis suggests that securities class
actions are not unique and that the factors that enable opt-outs to out-
perform the class may apply to other litigation contexts as well-at least
in those contexts where some class members hold sufficiently sizable
claims to justify individual litigation.
In fact, evidence from outside the securities litigation context sup-
ports this hypothesis. In antitrust price fixing litigation, large commercial
buyers (who presumably have the greatest damages) have repeatedly
opted out of the class and sued in individual actions, sometimes combin-
ing to file a consolidated complaint.8 9 In one of the largest antitrust class
action settlements on record, the major vitamin producers first pleaded
guilty to antitrust price fixing charges and then paid $1.17 billion in an
antitrust class action settlement. Again, over 200 corporations, including
large firms such as Tyson Foods and Quaker Oats, chose to opt out of the
class of more than 4,000 plaintiffs and sue individually.9 0 These opt-outs
89. Useful examples are provided by two major antitrust class actions brought against
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (ADM). In 1997, following its criminal conviction for price
fixing, ADM reached a civil settlement with class action plaintiffs in a suit alleging price
fixing in the citric acid market under which ADM paid $86 million, but some of the largest
purchasers-including Proctor & Gamble, Quaker Oats, and the Kraft Foods unit of Philip
Morris Co-opted out. See P&G, Quaker Oats, Unit of Philip Morris Sue Archer-Daniels,
Wall St. J., June 11, 1997, at B15. A year later, ADM was forced to reveal that it had paid
$36 million to four of these opt-out firms. One careful study has estimated that the opt-
outs received "from 2.0 to 3.5 times more damages (per dollar of citric acid purchased) than
did the settling class." See John M. Connor, Archer Daniels Midland: Price-Fixer to the
World 73 (Purdue Univ. Dept. of Agric. Econ., Staff Paper 00-11, 4th ed., 2000), available
at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/28664/1/spOO-11.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
Earlier, ADM had also been independently sued for price fixing in the lysine acid
market (lysine acid being an amino acid used by food companies and feedlots to promote
quick growth in hogs and chickens). It settled the class action for $45 million (after paying
a $70 million criminal fine to the Department ofJustice), but again some twenty-five large
customers opted out. See Thomas M. Burton, Several ADM Clients Won't Participate in a
Proposed Price-Fixing Settlement, Wall St. J., July 10, 1996, at B2. While the actual
amounts paid to these opt-outs is not known, one study has estimated that they would have
received "about $20 million"-again outperforming class members. See Connor, supra at
73.
90. See Carlos Tejada, Some Plaintiffs Quit Settlement in Vitamin Case, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 18, 2000, at B10. For a discussion of the opt-out procedures in this case, see In re
Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 327 F.3d 1207, 1208-09 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also In re




were reported to account for over seventy percent of the class in terms of
the volume of their purchases.9 1 The likelihood is high that in opting out
these sophisticated plaintiffs made an intelligent decision about their
own best interests. Logically, one should assume that, when seventy per-
cent of the claims opt out, this was not a complete surprise to class coun-
sel; rather, both sides may have structured the class action as the vehicle
for compensating the residual and less sophisticated plaintiffs.
In another very different litigation context-mass torts-opting out
is an even more established pattern. Some 90,000 persons opted out of
the diet drug (or "Fen-Phen") settlement reached by Wyeth.9 2 Character-
istically, such opt-outs have above average value claims, and, in mass tort
cases, the variation in claim value can be particularly great, based on the
highly variable physical injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. As a result, the
class action in the mass tort context became the repository for two catego-
ries of plaintiffs: (a) those whose claims either had evidentiary, factual,
or legal problems that made it undesirable to proceed individually; and
(b) future claimants who had not yet sustained injury.93
This same pattern then seems to prevail across a variety of contexts:
Opt-outs either hold higher value claims or are sufficiently credible liti-
gants that they can demand a larger settlement. Even if the reasons are
not fully understood, it should not surprise us that "big" litigants do bet-
ter than "small" litigants, even though the class action permits small liti-
gants to combine forces. Possibly, the defendants recognize that large,
well-financed opt-outs will simply not allow their counsel to settle cheaply
and thus prefer to settle these cases outside the class action.
D. The Limited Impact of Voice-Based Reforms
Most efforts to improve the position of the individual class member
in a class action have ignored exit and focused on enhancing voice. But
as this section will discuss, although well intentioned, these reforms have
only had a modest impact. Why have these very logical reforms not
changed the landscape of securities litigation? This Essay does not sug-
gest that voice-based reforms cannot work; instead, it hypothesizes that
they have less impact than anticipated because they fail to encourage
competition among counsel. As will be seen, the clearest impact of the
"lead plaintiff' provision has been to induce class counsel to form a larger
coalition of firms in order to win the competition for class counsel. By
91. See Tejada, supra note 90, at 310.
92. See Scott Hensley, Wyeth Says 90,000 Opt Out of 'Fen-Phen' Pact, Wall St. J., May
16, 2003, at B4.
93. The special problems of future claimants probably best explains why the Supreme
Court rejected the class settlement in Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598,
601 (1997) ("Settlement talks thus concentrated on devising an administrative scheme for
disposition of asbestos claims not yet in litigation."). It has today made mass tort cases
largely uncertifiable. Future claimants are inherently apathetic because each has only a
low base expectancy rate of suffering injury in the indeterminate future.
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itself, this transition to a larger number of firms handling the case does
little to benefit the class members (and may simply represent featherbed-
ding). But it was a predictable reaction to the incentives created by the
PSLRA: The larger the number of plaintiffs assembled as a team, the
greater their chance of winning the competition for the lead plaintiff
designation.
To understand this point and contextualize it, it is necessary to go
back to the period before passage of the PSLRA in 1995. Back then, se-
curities and antitrust class actions were basically organized in a similar
fashion. Typically, a multiplicity of actions would be filed in district
courts all over the country, and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (JPML) would determine to which district court it would refer
these actions for pretrial coordination and discovery. 9 4 Such a referral
was necessary because otherwise the first settlement with the defendants
would bar the other suits, as it (and the release of claims for the entire
class incident to that settlement) would carry preclusive effect.9 5
Suppose then that the JPML assigns the case to a specific district
courtjudge. What happens next? The classic folklore was that the first to
file would be named lead counsel and thus have control over the settle-
ment process. But this oversimplifies the matter, because no judicial de-
cision or rule ever articulated such a standard.
What actually happened was more complex. The court to which the
JPML assigned the case might find that it had ten to twenty different com-
plaints before it, each seeking discovery or pretrial relief. The logical first
step for the court was to organize the action, establishing committees of
counsel to deal with various issues. Recognizing that the court would
eventually appoint a lead counsel, the participating law firms usually
sought to preempt the court from choosing counsel by organizing their
side of the case themselves and electing their own lead counsel. Few
courts were sufficiently strong-minded to reject the firms' choice of lead
counsel, particularly when this saved the court work.
As a result, an informal political convention was typically assembled
at which all the participating plaintiffs' attorneys would elect a lead coun-
94. The JPML was created in 1968, roughly the same time as the modern class action
rules were formalized. See Multidistrict Litigation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat.
109, 109 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006)). The impact of the
JPML referral was diminished by the Supreme Court in Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach, which held that, after discovery was completed, the case had to be
transferred back to the original court in which it was filed. 523 U.S. 26, 28 (1998).
95. Today, this danger that the first team to settle wins has been largely mitigated by
the JPML, which moves all the competimg actions to the same court and thereby
discourages races to settlement. But the danger of a "reverse auction" under which
defendants force plaintiffs' attorneys to compete on the basis of which plaintiffs team will
offer or accept the cheapest settlement still arises when overlapping class actions are
pending in state and federal court. For the rare case in which a federal court has awoken
to the dangers of such a reverse auction, see Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d
277, 282-83 (7th Cir. 2002) (defining reverse auction).
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sel and a steering committee. Often, this caucus might be held in a hotel
room a day or so before plaintiffs' counsel's first appearance before the
court. As in all political conventions, political horse trading occurred. In
order to win votes to be elected class counsel, a candidate had to negoti-
ate deals under which those counsel supporting the candidate would be
placed on the action's steering committee and effectively promised that
they would be assigned billable work for which they could earn fees (if
the action settled). The losing side in these contests would receive no
such promises and might be excluded from work assignments; thus, they
might receive no fees, because the court awarding fees will usually defer
to the fee allocation among counsel made by the elected steering com-
mittee-an ad hoc law firm of sorts. The incentive for many counsel to
participate in this political process was that it assured them of some par-
ticipation in the action and a share of the fee award if the case settled. In
contrast, if the court simply selected the lead counsel, the counsel so se-
lected would thereafter have little incentive to invite redundant counsel
to participate in the litigation. Thus, the predictable consequence of the
brokered selection of class counsel was featherbedding and inefficiency.
Not only did this system produce overstaffing, but overstaffing in
turn reduced the likely fee award to those counsel who had most contrib-
uted to the action's success. Because courts will not permit the fee award
to exceed some maximum percentage of the recovery (typically, twenty-
five to thirty-five percent),96 overstaffing implied that those litigators who
actually carried the case to settlement would have to share the judicial fee
award with the patronage appointments that a political system inevitably
produced. In turn, this undercut the incentive to invest time in the ac-
tion, as all knew they had to share the expected return with redundant
attorneys.
Another consequence of this brokered system for organizing the
class action was that it eliminated open competition. Although there
were occasional struggles within the plaintiffs' camp that broke into the
open,9 7 plaintiffs' attorneys did not want these battles publicized, and
most could not afford to make enemies within the plaintiffs' bar for fear
that they would be excluded from future plaintiff teams. Smaller and
new entrant firms learned, just like junior Congressmen, that one got
along by going along. Overstaffed and undermotivated, the traditional
"ad hoc" plaintiffs' law firm was a model of inefficiency.f
96. During prior decades, the average fee award in securities class actions was around
thirty-two percent of the recovery. See supra note 59. Hence, the plaintiffs attorneys knew
that they had little chance of receiving a forty percent award.
97. For a detailed examination of one such episode (involving an antitrust class
action), see John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 252-61 (1983)
[hereinafter Coffee, Rescuing].
98. For discussions of patronage systems in which committee positions and leadership
roles in the class action were awarded in return for support in the election of lead counsel,
see id. at 256-59.
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The PSLRA changed this picture dramatically, but it only marginally
increased competition. Being "first to file" no longer made much sense,
because the PSLRA gave effective control of the securities class action to
the class member or members with the largest losses, even if this share-
holder or shareholder group never filed an action. Instead, a large insti-
tutional investor could take control of the class action simply by volun-
teering to serve as lead plaintiff-without ever filing any lawsuit or
seeking the support of others.
Quickly, the plaintiffs' bar learned to develop relationships with pub-
lic pension funds, unions, and other organizations that held large stock
positions. The Milberg Weiss firm, the longtime leader of the securities
class action bar, had moved relatively slowly towards this new system, hop-
ing to continue to compete by assembling large aggregations of individ-
ual plaintiffs. The SEC opposed such large aggregations, however, on the
grounds that they could not adequately monitor the attorney and so were
inconsistent with the PSLRA's statutory intent.9 9 As a result, because it
changed its position more slowly than its rivals, Milberg Weiss's near mo-
nopoly position eroded, and some other firms secured important lead
counsel positions.
Although contests for lead plaintiff certainly arose under this system,
the participants soon learned a new way to conduct them. Law firms
could and did solicit institutions (typically public pension funds) to serve
as lead plaintiff (with the understanding that the law firm would be cho-
sen by the institution as its class counsel), but predictably other law firms
could respond by assembling a rival and larger consortium of pension
funds and thereby win the contest. Even the eventually winning team had
to fear up to the last possible moment that some rival firm or firms would
either enter the competition or assemble a larger consortium of clients.
As a result, the logical strategy was not to proceed on a "lone wolf' basis,
but instead to assemble groups of law firms in order to combine their
clients into a larger consortium of institutions. Put differently, it was in
the interest of law firm X not to compete with law firm Y, but rather to
pool their institutional clients so that they could stave off the threat from
still other potential competitors. This means, of course, that the problem
of overstaffing has again resurfaced.
Professors Choi and Thompson provide empirical support for this
hypothesis, finding that the number of cases with a solo lead plaintiff law
firm fell from 31.9% in the pre-PSLRA period to 19.6% immediately after
99. The SEC expressed its opposition to a large number of shareholders sharing the
position of lead plaintiff in In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 216-17 (D.D.C.
1999) (noting SEC position that "'a court generally should only approve a group that is
small enough to be capable of effectively managing the litigation and the lawyers'"
(quoting Memorandum of the SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 16-17, In re Baan Co., 186 F.R.D.
214 (Civ. No. 98-2465))). Since that time, few law firms have attempted to assemble more
than five or six shareholders to serve collectively as lead plaintiffs.
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passage of the PSLRA. 0 0 Previously, consortiums of more than two law
firms had been rare, but Choi and Thompson identify, out of a sample of
219 post-PSLRA suits, some seventy-eight cases (or nearly thirty-six per-
cent) in which three, four, five, or even more law firms shared the lead
counsel position. 10 1 Once again, the better political brokers could knit
together large coalitions that would hold larger equity stakes.
In theory, law firms might share the lead counsel position for other
reasons than the need to assemble the largest equity stake-for example,
to create a synergistic combination of legal skills or to achieve efficient
risk diversification. But while these could be secondary motives, the driv-
ing force in the real world was the need to protect one's position against
potential larger coalitions that might arise at the last minute. Although
law firms could always combine to serve as co-class counsel, sharing a sin-
gle client, actual cases of co-counsel sharing a single client have proven
rare, both before and after the PSLRA. This pattern suggests that synergy
and risk diversification were not the primary motivators behind law firm
coalitions. Rather, the cement that held together law firm coalitions was
the need to assemble a client mass that would preempt competitive ef-
forts by other teams of attorneys. Asjust noted, Choi and Thompson find
that only in 19.6% of the post-PSLRA cases did law firms proceed on a
solo basis, and these cases probably consisted of either (1) those that were
too small in terms of the expected recovery to attract competition, or (2)
those in which the solo firm represented a client of preemptive size (for
example, CalPERS).
As firms and investors have gained experience with contests over the
lead plaintiff position, Choi and Thompson find that "repeat relation-
ships" have developed "between lead plaintiff law firms and institutional
investors" and that "institutional investors that potentially act as lead
plaintiffs tend to develop repeat relationships with only a handful of the
top-tier plaintiff law firms."1 02 Choi and Thompson express uncertainty
as to what forces were behind these repeat relationships, but certainly
political campaign contributions were likely one such force-and compe-
tition on this score obviously favors the larger and entrenched law firm.
To be sure, such repeat relationships could also be based on the institu-
tions' successful prior experience with some law firms, but once these
relationships formed, they became a barrier to new entrants.
At least in the case of the public pension funds, much anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that inter-firm competition for class counsel is largely
waged on a basis that does little for absent class members. Even apart
from pay-to-play practices that exchanged political contributions for legal
business, it became the common practice for the larger plaintiffs' firms to
100. Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1489, 1520-21
(2006).
101. Id. at 1521 tbl.4.
102. Id. at 1529.
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entertain, often lavishly, the officials of public pension funds. Marketing
is, of course, something that all law firms engage in, but the PSLRA fo-
cused plaintiffs' firms on the need to form alliances with public pension
funds. Anecdotal evidence shows the impact. In one well-known major
class action, the New York State Comptroller was estimated to have re-
ceived $200,000 in political contributions from two law firms (and the
families of their partners) in the year following their selection as co-class
counsel in a case in which the two firms eventually received a $55 million
fee award. 03 Eventually, scandals erupted, and individuals in the New
York State Comptroller's office have recently been indicted for their in-
volvement in pay-to-play arrangements. 104
In fairness, many of these contributions may have been defensive in
character; that is, one plaintiffs' law firm makes a contribution in order to
keep pace with its rivals and not be excluded from consideration as class
counsel. Nonetheless, the net result of this pay-to-play system of exchang-
ing political contributions for lead plaintiff designations is to rent the
pension fund as a lead plaintiff to the highest contributors. It may do
little damage to the pension funds, but it does effectively exclude smaller
firms and new entrants who have not previously made contributions.
Viewed in terms of a traditional antitrust concentration analysis, the
overall concentration level within the securities plaintiffs' bar neither
rose nor declined significantly after the enactment of the PSLRA in 1995.
Professors Choi and Thompson estimate the market share percentage of
the top five plaintiffs' firms before and after the PSLRA, as follows:10 5
TABLE 2: PRE-PSLRA MARKET SHARE PERCENTAGES
Milberg Weiss 27.9%
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP 11.0%
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP 8.1%
Berger & Montague, P.C. 4.8%
Abbey Spanier Rodd & Abrams, LLP 4.4%
Total: 56.2%
103. See Cox & Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note 14, at 1611-12
(describing incident). For a fuller sense of the total amount of these pay-to-play payments,
see Lovett, supra note 23 (finding law firms representing New York State to have received
over $518 million in fee awards in such cases over past ten years).
104. For an overview of this scandal, which resulted in the indictment of Hank Morris,
a political consultant, and employees of the New York State Comptroller's office, see Mike
McIntire, Pension Inquiry Reveals a Power Broker's Web, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2009, at Al;
Chris Smith, Follow the Pension Money, N.Y. Mag., Aug. 3, 2009, at 18. These scandals
have not involved plaintiffs' law firms, whose political contributions are fully disclosed, but
they do show a norm of reciprocity at work: Those who want business must contribute.
105. Choi & Thompson, supra note 100, at 1515 tbl.3.
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TABLE 3: PosT-PSLRA MARKET SHARE PERCENTAGES
Milberg Weiss 27.4%
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP 9.0%
Wolf Popper LLP 5.7%
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP 5.4%
Barack, Rodos & Bacine 4.7%
Total: 52.2%
In short, some firms rose and others fell, presumably in line with
their ability to win lead plaintiff designations, but in total there has been
only a small (four percent) decline in the concentration level. Moreover,
this modest shift toward greater competition may have been more than
offset by the increased need for plaintiffs' law firms to pool their clients
to win the coveted lead plaintiff status. From a competitive standpoint,
the market for class counsel services has basically remained static before
and after the PSLRA.
Of course, the modest nature of the above changes would mean little
if lead plaintiffs were doing more for the class, achieving either larger
settlements or recovering a higher percentage of the class members'
losses. Studies on this subject, however, suggest that this is not the case.
Professors Cox and Thomas find in 2006 that the ratio of settlement
amounts to estimated provable losses in securities class actions has actu-
ally declined since the passage of the PSLRA 0 6 and that settlement size
also did not increase following the PSLRA. 07 Although they find some
evidence that institutional lead plaintiffs did better for their class mem-
bers in terms of settlement size as compared with other categories of lead
plaintiffs,108 this finding was more than offset by their more pessimistic
finding that "institutional lead plaintiffs have the lowest average and me-
dian recovery percentages of any group."10 9 Taken together, these twin
facts suggest that institutional lead plaintiffs simply gravitate towards
larger cases.
Equally striking is Professors Cox and Thomas's finding that individ-
uals continue to be lead plaintiffs in the plurality of cases. They report
that single institutions and combinations of institutions with individuals
accounted for only eighteen percent of the cases in their post-PSLRA
sample, while groups of individuals accounted for forty-one percent of
106. Cox & Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note 14, at 1627.
107. The mean settlement size did increase from $9,734,000 to $15,728,000, but the
median settlement size rose only from $5,500,000 to $5,745,000. Id. at 1624. Both these
shifts may be largely the consequence of inflation and the increased size of the market
capitalization of defendant corporations in the post-PSLRA period. Cox and Thomas find
that overall settlement size did not change in any statistically significant way. Id. at
1628-29.
108. Id. at 1624. Explaining this finding is probably the fact that institutional
plaintiffs tend to serve in larger cases against larger defendants. Id. at 1625-26.
109. Id. at 1627.
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post-PSLRA settlements. 110 This suggests that the desire of institutions to
serve as lead plaintiff has been largely limited to public pension funds
(and even then only in the larger and more publicized cases).
What then is the bottom line? Once they controlled for all obvious
variables, Professors Cox and Thomas notice that "post-PSLRA settle-
ments are not statistically different from those in the pre-PSLRA pe-
riod."11 Thus, they conclude that "[t]hese results suggest that the enact-
ment of the PSLRA had no significant impact on settlement size."11 2
Worse yet, they find that "[i]nvestors appear to be recovering a smaller
percentage of their losses today than they did before the passage of the
PSLRA."11 s Although more visible battles for control of the class action
may occur now than under the pre-PSLRA system, the problem is that
this competition is for the loyalty and favor of those institutions that can
serve as lead plaintiff; it is not a competition aimed at improving the re-
covery of individual class members.
Nor does it appear likely that institutions will eventually serve as lead
plaintiffs in most cases. Institutional lead plaintiffs, Cox and Thomas
conclude, are "very selective" in their choice of cases, agreeing to serve as
lead plaintiffs only in the largest cases with the greatest potential dam-
ages.' 14 In effect, institutions seem to be "cherry picking," taking the
largest and most attractive cases. This may reflect their status as public
bodies with elected officials who may wish to be visibly engaged in high-
profile litigation on behalf of investors. Whatever the motive, institutions
appear to leave the less attractive, less visible cases for others to serve as
lead plaintiff. Practices may evolve still further, but at present, even opti-
mistic commentators appear to agree that "the lead plaintiff rules have
not significantly changed the environment" of securities litigation.1 15
E. An Evaluation
On the evidence considered so far, exit seems to be outperforming
voice. Still, three considerations must be kept in mind before any final
assessment can be fairly reached:
1. The Exit Threshold. - Although the "exit" option appears to have
been preferred by investors in several highly publicized, mega-class ac-
tions, these were largely cases in which the defendants had presumptive
liability and in which the enormous size of the opt-outs' losses motivated
these institutions to deviate from their normal passivity. Thus, these cases
110. Id. at 1623.
111. Id. at 1628-29.
112. Id. at 1629.
113. Id. at 1637.
114. Id. at 1629. These largest cases may also be the ones with the highest public
profile, reflecting the fact that public pension funds often have politically prominent
leaders who may enjoy, and benefit from, the attention and publicity in such cases.
115. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 12, at 197 ("Entrepreneurial attorneys
continue to dominate securities class action practice today as they did in prior years.").
2010] 325
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
do not imply that opting out will necessarily be an equally attractive strat-
egy in the much more common class action that settles for considerably
less than $100 million. At some point, there is a floor beneath which
opting out will not be economically viable. Also, opting out may not be
attractive in high-risk cases or in cases where institutional investors may
be subject to special defenses or burdensome discovery.
In addition, because the defendant can typically afford to go to trial
against the individual opt-out plaintiff (whereas the defendant will rarely
risk trial in the case of a much larger class action), the institution's deci-
sional calculus as to whether to opt out must factor in the possibility of an
expensive trial and even a litigated loss. Sometimes, the institution may
prefer to hide within the herd in the class action rather than face an
individual trial. Still, today's boundary line for opting out may decline
further, as both the plaintiffs' bar and institutional investors learn to
economize on the costs of such litigation.
2. The Impact on Small Claimants. - The impact of opt-out plaintiffs
on the remaining class members remains debatable. Will the remaining
class members' per-share recovery shrink to offset the gain in the opt-
outs' recovery? In principle, class counsel should be motivated by the
fear of more opt-outs to seek an improved class settlement, because a
weak settlement will motivate more opt-outs and hence a reduced fee
award for class counsel. But defendants can be expected to resist paying
twice: once to the class and again to the opt-outs. Defendants will pre-
dictably try to deter opting out and, failing that, to reduce the class settle-
ment to reflect the opt-outs. But, precisely because opt-outs typically do
better than the class, defendants will need to disproportionately reduce
the class settlement in order to protect themselves from the future and
likely superior opt-out settlements. For example, if we assume that opt-
outs, on average, did twice as well, then defendants, to stay even, might
need to reduce the class action settlement by twenty percent to reflect
opt-outs by ten percent of the class.
Class counsel will, of course, resist such disproportionate reductions,
but need only resist selectively. Here, their self-interest is not well aligned
with that of all class members. Although class counsel cannot allow the
class settlement to appear less attractive to those marginal class members
who are capable of opting out and securing individual representation, a
self-interested class counsel need not worry about those "negative value"
claimants who cannot opt out because their individual claims are not eco-
nomically viable. Thus, public policy needs to be concerned about prac-
tices that amount in substance to price discrimination-that is, that allow
large claimants to recover more than small claimants because only the
former opt out.
How could class counsel and defendants collude to discriminate
against small claimants who cannot opt out? Some techniques seem pre-
dictable. The class settlement could, for example, impose more complex
procedures for filing and proving claims. Such procedures will not deter
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most institutional investors, who generally keep accurate records, but it
might deter individual retail claimants whose recordkeeping may be
more informal. If the amounts not claimed by the small individual claim-
ants went by default to those larger (and largely institutional) investors
who did file and prove their claims, these larger class members would do
better in the class settlement and have less incentive to opt out. Alterna-
tively, if these unclaimed amounts instead reverted to the defendant,
which is today the less common practice, then the defendant would be
less injured by, and could live with, a large, but illusory, class settlement
that is not fully paid out. Either way, small claimants may be at risk be-
cause of the increased pressure placed on class counsel by opt-outs.
The possibility that opt-outs will reduce the per-share recovery of the
remaining class members raises a normative policy question: Should opt-
outs be restricted on fairness grounds? Should society be concerned that
smaller investors might lose precisely to the extent that institutional inves-
tors do better? Here, three different arguments merit consideration.
First, although principles of distributive justice may lead one to disfa-
vor a system under which wealthy investors receive greater per share re-
coveries than less well-off investors, it is far from clear how such egalita-
rian preferences should be applied. Even if institutional opt-outs
adversely affect the investors who remain in the class, these smaller inves-
tors in the class are still typically wealthy and diversified. In contrast, the
beneficiaries of pension plans (and particularly public pension plans,
which have been the most frequent opt-outs) are characteristically poorer
retirees who are dependent on their pensions for retirement income.
Thus, if public policy is to be guided by a Rawlsian desire to favor the
worst off, individual investors do not necessarily merit any preference
over pensioners or the beneficiaries of other institutional investors.
Second, even if opt-outs do injure the residual class members in the
short run, they may benefit them in the long run. Over the long run,
increased opting out will place class counsel under increased competitive
pressure to improve the class settlement. Faced with competition and the
risk that a "cheap" settlement will produce a higher rate of opt-outs, class
counsel should seek to reach a superior settlement in order to avoid the
fee reduction that follows from a smaller class size.
Third, opt-outs should reduce the smaller class members' recovery
only when defendants negotiate disproportionate reductions to reflect
the opt-outs or impose complex and onerous claim filing requirements.
Such tactics are, however, subject to judicial control if courts are alerted
to them. The better way to protect the class is not to discourage opt-outs,
but to limit any reduction of the class recovery to an amount proportion-
ate to the opt-outs' claims. Litigation governance is vulnerable to the risk
that defendants and large claimants could collude to the detriment of
smaller claimants, but such an outcome is not inevitable. Rather, under-
standing this vulnerability should lead courts to focus their scrutiny on
signs of such collusion in reviewing class action settlements.
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3. judicial Economy. - The last consideration that must be weighed
in evaluating the "exit versus voice" tradeoff is the value ofjudicial econ-
omy. More opt-outs mean more work for courts. It also means that the
class action settlement process will be slower and more difficult, because
the defendant does not achieve finality. Lacking finality, defendants may
be slower to settle, fearing that the settlement may trigger a wave of opt-
outs, and may on occasion even go to trial, thereby resulting in greater
work and delay for courts.
Still, the evidence to date is that these opt-outs from securities class
actions have settled quickly, sometimes without an action even being
filed. In the future, opt-out cases might often be resolved through arbi-
tration. To be sure, if the minimum level at which opting out were feasi-
ble were to decline to a much lower level (say, $500,000 in losses), more
actions would mean more trials and more work for courts. It was precisely
for this reason that federal district courts long resisted opt-outs, seeking
instead to encourage a global final settlement. But the law has changed
significantly over the last decade in ways that have restricted courts' abil-
ity to discourage opt-outs.1 16
Other factors have also increased the volume of individual securities
litigation. The 2008 financial crisis grew out of problems in the debt mar-
kets. Because the debt markets are normally not considered to be effi-
cient, the "fraud on the market" doctrine has been held not to apply to
them, thus requiring plaintiffs to show individual reliance. This in turn
precludes a finding of "predominance" under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.1 17 The bottom line is that plaintiffs in cases
involving debt securities need to sue on an individual or consolidated
basis, thereby again downsizing the role of the opt-out class action. More-
over, as individual securities actions become more common, the domi-
nance of the large class action plaintiffs' firms may decline, and greater
competition seems likely.
Ultimately, litigation governance cannot rely exclusively on exit or
voice, but must balance the two. Exit does, however, seem to encourage a
116. Once, federal courts could and did enjoin state court trials involving opt-outs
where the federal court believed that the state trial might disrupt a pending settlement of
the class action in federal court. See, e.g., In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335
(2d Cir. 1985) (discussing authority for issuance of injunction). More recently, this broad
power has been curtailed. See Ret. Sys. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d 419, 430-31
(2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting claim that All Writs Act authorizes district court to enjoin state
court trial merely because state action would delay scheduled trial in federal court).
117. See Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d
196, 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding predominance requirement not satisfied in case involving
debt securities). The Second Circuit has also found that the market for initial public
offerings (IPOs) is generally not efficient and so individual reliance may also need to be
established in this context. This would again encourage institutional investors to turn to
individual actions rather than seek class certification. See In re Initial Public Offering Sec.




competition that directly benefits the class member, whereas the "lead
plaintiff' provision (a prototypical voice-based reform) appears today to
mainly cause counsel to curry favor with a limited number of institutional
investors. Given the still developing state of the law and practice in this
field, this Essay contents itself with the modest conclusion that as exit
becomes more common, strains will appear in the legal system. Predict-
ably, defendants will seek ways to discourage opt-outs or to penalize the
remaining class members for the opt-outs' greater success. Nonetheless,
greater competition seems to be coming, and that will impose some bur-
dens on courts.
III. ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES FOR AGGREGATE LITIGATION:
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
From a governance perspective, the oldest maxim is, "One size
doesn't fit all."s18 No one structure of corporate governance is optimal
for all firms. The same is likely true for litigation governance where legal
systems and legal cultures differ markedly. Thus, as Europe in particular
explores the need for new means by which to deal with aggregate litiga-
tion, it makes sense to explore the range of governance models that
might feasibly be employed. Watching Europe begin this exploratory
process, U.S. commentators have largely divided into two camps: (1)
those who believe that Europe, by one means or another, must adopt the
key features of U.S. entrepreneurial litigation (in particular, the opt-out
class and the contingency fee);' 1 9 and (2) those who want to warn
Europe of the dangers in moving to a U.S. style system of entrepreneurial
litigation.120
This Essay does not intend to endorse either position. Rather, its
focus is on alternative models and the availability of functional substi-
tutes. For example, if Europe does not want to adopt the contingent fee,
what alternatives are possible to fund aggregate litigation and how would
their impact be different? In sequence, this Part will first focus on the
alternatives to the opt-out class and then turn to the topic of litigation
funding. Ultimately, its basic claim is that if Europe wishes to resist the
U.S. entrepreneurial model and if a voice-based democratic model is sim-
ply infeasible, it should consider a model that largely parallels U.S. public
118. For representative critiques of the "one size fits all" fallacy, see Steven M.
Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 89, 97, 160 (2007)
(criticizing fallacy of "one size fits all"); Gerard Hertig, On-Going Board Reforms: One
Size Fits All and Regulatory Capture, 21 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol. 269, 269-70 (2005)
(criticizing tendency of European countries to follow United States on a "me too" basis).
119. Professors Issacharoff and Miller, two of the most astute scholars of class actions,
fall into this camp. See Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 12, at 180-81 (applauding current
European reforms partly based on "American experience" and "simple economics of
incentive systems").
120. Professor Richard Nagareda, also a respected scholar, seems to fall into this
camp. See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 2 (noting widespread view that U.S. litigation rules
"generate a considerable and undesirable drag on the U.S. economy").
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interest litigation. This model could be fitted to the existing institutional
structure in Europe with only modest adjustments. 121
A. Opting In Versus Opting Out
With only a few exceptions, existing European class action proce-
dures employ an opt-in rather than an opt-out procedure. 12 2 Motivating
this preference is in part the jurisprudential idea that a litigant should
not be bound by agents that the litigant has not authorized to act on the
litigant's behalf, and in part a strong aversion to American-style en-
trepreneurial litigation. But observers both in the United States and
Europe have expressed skepticism that opt-in classes are feasible for at
least three distinct reasons: (1) participation rates will be low, with the
result that neither deterrence nor victim compensation is achieved;12 3
(2) a "free rider" problem will discourage anyone from volunteering to
serve as the representative plaintiff, because the passive class member
shares in the gains, but not in the possible losses that flow from the com-
mon European "loser pays" rule; 124 and (3) opt-in classes deny defend-
ants the virtue of finality.125 All these claims have some merit, but they
still may be overstated.
1. Participation Rates. - Leading U.S. scholars have estimated that
the rate of opt-outs in consumer cases between 1993 and 2003 was, on
average, less than 0.2%-less than two in a thousand.1 2 6 But there is dan-
ger in relying on this statistic to determine the likely participation in an
opt-in class, because opting out makes no sense for a person holding a
"negative value" claim, while opting in is entirely rational. The incidence
of rational behavior is not well estimated by looking to the rate of irra-
tional behavior.
A better measure of likely participation comes from the actual expe-
rience in those European countries that have actively employed an opt-in
procedure. Professor Henrik Lindblom of Sweden has surveyed the expe-
rience under his country's recent opt-in class action procedure, which
121. Professor Rubenstein has described a similar model as an "expertise model." See
Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate, supra note 49, at 1663-68. This Essay will not adopt that
term, because Rubenstein's primary concern is with ideological and political divisions
within public interest litigation, which are less likely to arise in consumer, antitrust,
securities, and environmental litigation. These latter areas are those in which Europe
wishes to modestly encourage aggregate litigation. Unlike Rubenstein's proposal, which
allows those with expertise to censor insurgents, the model here proposed intends greater
competition.
122. See supra note 37.
123. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 12, at 203-06.
124. Id. at 203-04.
125. Id. at 206-07.
126. See Eisenberg & Miller, Opt-Outs, supra note 50, at 1532.
330 [Vol. 110:288
LITIGATION GOVERNANCE
was adopted in 2002.127 As of 2007, he found nine examples, several of
which follow:
In a 2003 case, an airline went bankrupt after having received pay-
ments from passengers for tickets. An individual brought suit on behalf
of himself and some 700 other passengers. After the court with jurisdic-
tion over the case notified these 700 passengers, 500 opted in, and the
case settled for a total of roughly 70,000 euros.12 8 Because the value of
each individual action for ticket payments was modest, these were quin-
tessential "negative value" claims.
In a 2004 case, a nonprofit corporation was formed by prospective
litigants to sue a life insurance company that transferred substantial assets
to its parent, allegedly for inadequate consideration. 129 Out of 1.2 mil-
lion policy holders, some 15,000 individuals opted in and also paid mem-
bership dues of fifteen euros, allowing the nonprofit organization to
amass capital of over 200,000 euros to fund the litigation.13 0 Although
this percentage may seem low, it must be remembered that no actual loss
was experienced by these class members and that they also had to make a
cash payment to opt in.
In 2004, the Swedish consumer ombudsman brought a class action
on behalf of 7,000 customers of a utility for failure to supply electricity, as
agreed, under a fixed price contract.13 1 This was the first public enforce-
ment action under the Swedish class action statute.' 3 2
In 2007, the residents of a suburb adjoining an airport formed a non-
profit organization, which then sued the Swedish Airports and Air
Navigation Service for damages resulting from aviation noise on behalf of
some 20,000 residents.' 3 3 At least 7,000 individuals in the area affected
by the aviation noise opted into the class.' 3 4
Few other European countries appear to have had the same depth of
experience as Sweden with opt-in class actions. But in Belgium, which
also mandates opt-in classes, a consumer organization and a consulting
firm specializing in the representation of minority shareholders con-
127. See Henrik Lindblom, The Globalization of Class Actions (Dec. 6, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://
www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events-media/SwedenNationalReport.
pdf.
128. Id. at 21-22 (discussing Bo Aberg v. Elfeterios Kefales, Stockholm Dist. Ct., T
3515 (2003), transferred, Nacka Dist. Ct., T 1281 (2004), also known as the "Air Olympic"
case).
129. Id. at 22-33 (discussing Grupptalan mot Skandia v. F6rsakringsaktiebolaget
Skandia, Stockholm Dist. Ct., T 97 (2004)).
130. Id. at 22.
131. Id. at 23-24 (discussing The Consumer Ombudsman v. Kraftkommission i
Sverige AB, Umel Dist. Ct., T 5416 (2004)).
132. Id. at 23.
133. Id. at 25 (discussing Carl de Geer et al. v. The Swedish Airports & Air Navigation




vinced some five thousand minority shareholders (out of an identified
total of eleven thousand) to opt into a class action against a major corpo-
ration.' 3 5 This roughly forty-five percent opt-in ratio is even more im-
pressive because many of these shareholders also had to advance legal
fees to join the action.' 3 6
Anecdotal as this experience is, both the Swedish examples and the
Belgian case seem noteworthy because of the lack of any prior relation-
ship or community among the class members in these cases. Commenta-
tors have opined that opt-in procedures might work in cases where the
potential class members had a preexisting relationship (such as employ-
ees in the same office in a case involving a workplace dispute).1 3 7 But
customers of a utility, defrauded minority shareholders, airline passen-
gers, insurance policy holders, or residents of a large suburb have little in
common. Nor is it likely that most of these class members who opted in
considered any of these disputes to be matters of urgent importance to
them. This experience suggests that if clear notice is given individually to
class members and a credible nonprofit consumer organization or public
ombudsman leads the action, rates of participation in the range of one-
third to over one-half are possible. While class members rarely respond
to the notices they are given in U.S. class actions, this may be in part a
product of the fact that class counsel has no need to induce them to
respond in an opt-out system and may even hope that they remain quietly
passive.
Some U.S. experience also shows that opt-in rates can reach or ex-
ceed fifty percent under favorable circumstances. Several U.S. statutes-
most notably the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 1 38 but also the
135. See Matthias E. Storme & Evelyne Terryn, Belgium Report on Class Actions 6
(Dec. 13, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available
at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/eventsmedia/Belgium
NationalReport.pdf. Of these five thousand shareholders that did opt in, some two
thousand were members of the consumer organization Test-Aankoop, and the rest were
clients of the consulting firm Deminor.
136. The consumer organization had greater success in convincing its members to
join the action because its members did not have to bear legal fees, which were advanced
by their organization. In contrast, the clients of Deminor were required "to advance a
limited sum to cover the costs of the proceedings." Id. Thus, although the overall opt-in
rate was slightly over forty-five percent (i.e., 5,000 out of 11,000), only about one-third of
the clients of Deminor ultimately authorized the firm to represent them in the action. Id.
This disparity suggests that any obligation to advance legal costs will deter opt-ins even
more than the tendency of small claimants to be rationally apathetic. It also underscores
the obvious utility of using consumer organizations in the role of lead plaintiff in
jurisdictions that forbid contingency fees, at least to the extent that such organizations are
willing to bear all or most of the litigation's expenses.
137. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 12, at 204-05 (describing workplace
litigation as "specialized context" where "class members have many opportunities to
communicate with one another about the litigation"). But see infra note 147 (noting opt-
in rate in workplace litigation could be unrepresentatively low because of deterrent effect
of employer-employee relationship).
138. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)(2006) (specifying opt-in requirement for FISA).
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)1 39 and the Equal Pay
Act 140-employ a mandatory opt-in procedure. A 1996 study by the
Federal Judicial Center calculated the opt-in rates for three FLSA cases
and found them to be thirty-nine, sixty-one, and seventy-three percent.14 1
A more recent study of some twenty-one FLSA cases found the average
opt-in rate to be considerably lower at 15.71%,142 but it also found that if
the two actions with the highest and lowest rates were excluded as outli-
ers, this rate rose to 23.34%.143 In one case, 204 out of 228 claimants, or
89.5%, opted in, showing that at least under some circumstances a high
percentage of claimants can be induced to opt in. 144 Moreover, as plain-
tiffs' attorneys become more adept in using websites and email solicita-
tions to reach potential class members, participation rates seem likely to
rise.145
This evidence can be read in different ways. Clearly, the likely partic-
ipation rate for eligible claimants will be significantly below the automatic
100% participation rate in an opt-out class action. But, as next discussed,
class members who do not opt out in an opt-out class action may still go
uncompensated because they often fail to file claims post-settlement; in
contrast, opt-in class members, having elected to participate, are unlikely
to be so indifferent. Although opt-in levels can sometimes exceed fifty
percent, proponents of the opt-out class still argue that the U.S. experi-
ence is largely with workplace litigation, which is arguably unrepresenta-
tive, because workplace litigation tends to involve smaller and more
139. See id. § 626(b) (similar opt-in requirement for ADEA).
140. See id. § 216(d) (mandating that opt-in procedure for FLSA also apply to Equal
Pay Act).
141. Thomas Willging et al., Fed. Judicial Ctr., Empirical Study of Class Actions in
Four Federal District Courts 54 (1996), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
142. See Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Class Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage
Law Enforcement in the Federal Courts, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 269, 294 (2008)
(discussing low opt-in rate of 15.71% in FLSA cases).
143. Id. at 294 n.129.
144. Id. at 293 (displaying opt-in rate of 89.5% in Lindsay v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co.,
448 F.3d 416, 425 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
145. Attorneys at the Texas law firm of Starzyk & Associates, P.C., which specializes in
FLSA cases, inform me that they use a website for each FLSA action to alert employees of a
defendant company and that they send emails to all employees in the relevant job
descriptions that are the subject of the FLSA litigation. They also alerted me to one recent
California class action in which 256 out of the 364 persons eligible to participate in a "wage
and hour" settlement elected to do so; this represents a 70.33% participation rate. See
Declaration of Monica Balderrama in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement at 16, Winzelberg v. Liberty Mutual Co., No. CV 07-460 GAF (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15,
2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In this light, historic participation rates in
the fifteen to twenty-three percent range may understate the potential for the opt-in class
when internet solicitation techniques are utilized.
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closely knit groups.146 Even if this is true,' 4 7 the Swedish and Belgian
examples discussed above suggest that participation rates will be higher
when the action is led by an organization that has an established reputa-
tion for leadership in the field (and possibly a willingness to subsidize
some of the action's costs). The greater credibility of such a representa-
tive plaintiff may be able to close much of the gap in participation rates
between opt-in and opt-out class actions.
More importantly, the great fallacy in contrasting the high or univer-
sal participation rate in opt-out class actions with the lower rate in opt-in
actions is that this comparison looks only at the front end and ignores the
back end of the proceeding. Although the opt-out class action includes
everyone, relatively low percentages of the class may actually file claims
after a settlement is achieved. Professors Cox and Thomas find that less
than thirty percent of the institutional investors in the securities class ac-
tions that they studied filed claims after a settlement had been
reached.14 8 In some special contexts, the rate is even less and may fall to
one percent or lower.149 Because institutional investors generally hold
claims for significant amounts (at least in proportion to the minimal cost
of filing a claim) and because they are generally thought to be sophisti-
cated, this evidence suggests that proponents of the opt-out class have
overstated their case and that the presumed difference in participation
may be largely illusory. Even if the opt-out class action includes the pas-
sive holders of negative value claims, these negative value claimants do
not actually benefit from such an action where, for whatever reason, they
fail to file a claim. In short, apathy reemerges at the back end of the opt-
out class action where a procedure resembling the act of opting in re-
mains necessary if the class member is to receive compensation.
146. Id.; see also Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 12, at 204-05 (discussing specialized
context of workplace litigation and factors contributing to increased participation rates).
147. This claim that potential class members in workplace litigation will be more
prepared to sue, either because they know each other or because they share some common
identity, overlooks the fact that in workplace litigation plaintiffs are typically suing their
employer. Few will be deterred from suing a manufacturer of a defective product with
whom they have no contact, but many more will be cautious about suing their employer.
Hence, the opt-in rate in workplace litigation could even be unrepresentatively low.
148. Cox & Thomas, Slip Through Your Fingers, supra note 68, at 413.
149. Extremely low participation rates have been reported in the case of coupon
settlements, where the rate appears to fall below one percent. See, e.g., James Tharin &
Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 18 Geo.J. Legal Ethics 1443,
1448 (2005). For recent examples, see Yeagley v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-03403, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5040, at *5 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 18, 2008) (finding that less than one percent of
class responded to settlement notice); Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d.
1292, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (rejecting proposed settlement, in part because "very low
numbers of class members" expressed interest in $19 coupon, which was principal
component of proposed settlement).
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Little is known about why so few eligible claimants file claims.15 0 In
some contexts, the typically modest recovery rate may be so low that class
members simply remain indifferent to what they see as only nominal com-
pensation. Or, it may be that some defendants or sophisticated claimants
find it in their interest to discourage small or less sophisticated class
members from filing by making the proof of claim process demanding
(in order to maximize the recovery for themselves) .151 In any event, pro-
ponents appear to have exaggerated the actual compensatory benefits, at
least to small claimants, of opt-out class actions. In truth, U.S. class action
procedures may do at the back end what European procedures do at the
front end. That is, procedures for filing claims in the United States may
screen out smaller claimants as effectively as the opt-in requirement in
European class actions does at the front end of litigation.
In this light, the truer advantage of the opt-out class over the opt-in
class involves not their relative compensatory benefits, but the greater de-
terrent threat that the opt-out class generates by aggregating more claims.
Still, this asserted advantage raises an important issue: How much deter-
rence by private enforcement is desirable? Although the opt-out class ac-
tion generates greater deterrence, it may also unfairly distort the out-
comes in litigation by generating an "extortionate" pressure to settle.
This topic will be returned to shortly.
150. Of course, the most obvious hypothesis is that class counsel in opt-out class
actions are not motivated to pay for, or accept the delay incident to, the use of more costly
notice procedures that will elicit higher participation rates. Because some federal circuits
base the fee award on the settlement size and not on the portion of the settlement actually
paid out, the plaintiffs' attorney in these circuits has little economic incentive to encourage
class members to file claims. See Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423,
437 (2d Cir. 2007) (favoring fee award based on total settlement fund). Alternatively,
institutional investors may have little interest in expending funds to attract retail investors
to participate and thus share the recovery with them. The lead plaintiff may thus have a
conflict with smaller class members. I have discussed the issue of participation rates with
the professional "claims administrators" of class action settlements (including the largest of
these, which is the Garden City Group, Inc.) and have been advised that participation rates
are highly variable, often falling below ten percent, but can reach much higher
percentages when individual class members will receive a cash payment of several hundred
dollars or more. Nonpecuniary relief, such as a coupon settlement, elicits much lower
levels of participation.
151. Where the settlement contains no reversion provision, all of the settlement goes
to those class members who do file. Reverter clauses entitling defendants to unclaimed
settlement funds were once common. Cf. Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer,
Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1997, at 97, 106
(describing reverter funds settlements, including Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472
(1980), a "well-known reverter fund case"). But they are today disfavored because
sophisticated courts have come to recognize that reverter clauses produce illusory
settlements. Such clauses were discouraged by the PSLRA, which requires that the fee
award to the class attorneys be based only on damages "actually paid to the class." See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2006). This
reversed (but only for securities class actions) the prior rule of Boeing Co., 444 U.S. at




2. The Free Rider Problem and the Representative Plaintiff - Logically,
rational parties should be reluctant to serve as the representative plaintiff
(or "lead plaintiff' in the PSLRA's parlance). In both opt-out and opt-in
class actions, the absent class members who do file a claim receive the
same proportionate recovery of their losses as the representative party,
but the representative must bear unreimbursed costs and face exposure
to potential fee shifting. This exposure is exacerbated in Europe by the
general prevalence of a "loser pays" rule. 15 2 But, even in the United
States, the PSLRA mandates a presumption in favor of fee shifting in se-
curities actions as a penalty for plaintiffs' failure to plead in compliance
with the federal rules.' 53 Given the lead plaintiffs potential exposure to
fee shifting, institutional investors might logically prefer to remain free
riders and undertake no role that could give rise to such liability. In most
respects, opt-out and opt-in classes differ only marginally; rather, the
more critical variable is the risk of adverse fee shifting, which is higher
outside the United States.
Logical as this theory may be that everyone should free ride, the em-
pirical evidence is to the contrary: Persons and entities do in fact accept
the role of lead plaintiff. Why? In the United States, the practice is clear:
The entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorney implicitly agrees to assume all ex-
penses and to hold the representative plaintiff harmless from any fee
shifting. To the extent that U.S. judges shift fees, which they are gener-
ally reluctant to do, they typically impose them on class counsel rather
than the lead plaintiff. 15 4 Because of the general absence of a contingent
fee in Europe, it is less likely that the nonentrepreneurial attorney in
Europe would commit to assume these costs (or that European courts
would see the class counsel as the logical target of fee shifting).
Another possible reason for public pension funds accepting the role
of lead plaintiff is the desire of their leaders to receive political contribu-
tions from plaintiffs' law firms (i.e., pay-to-play). Again, this is unlikely to
be a motive in Europe, where entrepreneurial law firms have not devel-
oped in the absence of the contingent fee and where campaign contribu-
tions play a lesser role in politics. But other reasons could motivate some
152. The so-called "English rule" under which the loser pays the winner's reasonable
legal expenses prevails across Europe, but there is disagreement in Europe as to whether
the class members who opt in to a class should be liable (or only the representative
plaintiff). See Hodges, supra note 10, at 126-27 ("[A]n opt-out rule may be unacceptable
as a matter of principle in those jurisdictions that value a 'loser pays' rule highly."). Where
class members are liable, it is likely that few will opt in.
153. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78U-4(c) (3)
(creating "presumption in favor of attorneys' fees and costs" in certain circumstances). In
particular, section 21D(c)(3)(A)(ii) makes fee shifting presumptive for any "substantial
failure of any complaint to comply with any requirement of Rule 11(b)." Because
plaintiffs, not defendants, draft the complaint, the risk of such a sanction falls more heavily
on plaintiffs.
154. Section 21D(c) (2) expressly states that the court can shift fees and impose them




entities to serve as the representative party even in a world in which fee
shifting under a "loser pays" rule was likely. These would include:
a. The Desire for Voice. - If the class member has large losses, ac-
cepting the role of representative plaintiff may give it the ability to influ-
ence the litigation and have a de facto veto over settlement offers. This
may well be a factor in U.S. securities class actions as well, where the insti-
tution serving as lead plaintiff may want to influence issues such as the
scope of the class period (to ensure that most of its losses are covered).
b. Insurance. - Fee shifting and the "loser pays" rule can be dealt
with through insurance. If all class members who opt in would contribute
a modest amount (or if a nonprofit representative plaintiff would ad-
vance the cost of the premium against later reimbursement), insurance
should be available so that the representative plaintiff would bear no
more than minimal risk.
c. Nonprofit Immunity. - As the Swedish experience shows, class
members can organize a nonprofit association and use it to serve as the
representative plaintiff. This gives other class members immunity (to the
extent that only the representative plaintiff has liability for fee shifting).
Alternatively, a recognized consumer association or other public interest
group may accept this role, confident that under local law or practice it
will have limited exposure to fee shifting.
Probably the most likely pattern in Europe will be the continued use
of consumer groups and other associations committed to special public
interest missions (for example, protection of the environment). These
groups will assume the risks of litigation because that is the purpose for
which their members joined and for which they pay dues, but increas-
ingly they will turn to insurance to mitigate the impact of a "loser pays"
rule. Predictably, the insurance industry should welcome the additional
business. 15 5 An additional impact of a "loser pays" rule may be to en-
courage such plaintiffs to undertake a stronger screening role, refusing to
bring actions that have questionable legal merit (even if the actions offer
high potential damages). In turn, this may make the introduction of class
actions more politically acceptable in Europe.
All said, the bottom line is still that it will be more difficult to find a
representative plaintiff in Europe, but those candidates that do elect to
serve are more likely to exercise a restraining discretion. On the positive
side of the ledger, Europe is not likely to see the appearance of nominal
plaintiffs that are controlled by entrepreneurial law firms (which was the
recurring fact pattern in recent U.S. criminal prosecutions of plaintiffs
155. Indeed, because directors and officers insurers typically insure the litigation costs
of corporate defendants and their officers and directors, it would make obvious economic
sense for them also to insure the plaintiffs against the risk that these costs would be shifted
to them under a "loser pays" rule. Economically, the same insurer might want to insure
both sides, thereby receiving premiums from both sides for the same risk. A single insurer
might also increase the pressure to keep litigation costs down to reasonable levels.
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attorneys).156 How these two problems-incentivizing a lead plaintiff to
serve and holding it accountable-should be balanced can be reasonably
debated, but the more that representative plaintiffs have their reputa-
tional capital at stake, the more that problems of accountability are
reduced.
3. Finality. - An opt-in class action does not achieve a global peace
on its settlement. The defendant who settles an opt-in class action must
still worry that a favorable settlement, if publicized, may elicit the filing of
other class and individual actions. In contrast, given the low rate of opt-
outs in U.S. class actions, an opt-out class action's settlement did tradi-
tionally confer finality. Thus, the defendant's dilemma in the opt-in set-
ting is not unlike that discussed earlier in connection with the "exit versus
voice" tradeoff: Defendants do not know what their total exposure will
be. The higher the class settlement in this opt-in context, the greater the
possibility that additional litigants will emerge from out of the woodwork
to commence suit.
Although defendants may prefer finality, this preference should
hardly lead them to favor the opt-out class action, because the opt-out
class inherently multiplies the damages that can be asserted and thus
gives class counsel greater leverage. Instead, the participant that most
bears the cost of reduced finality (and is thus more likely to resist opt-in
procedures) is the court, because more and duplicative actions are likely
to be litigated under opt-in procedures. From the court's perspective,
this wastes scarce judicial resources.
Still, the social cost accounting is more complex and mixed. Reduc-
ing the prospect of finality also reduces the prospect of collusion. The
defendant has less incentive or ability to seek to exchange a high fee
award for a modest settlement in the case of an opt-in class, both because
the stakes are smaller and because the opt-in class has greater control
over its counsel. Also, the opt-in class encourages competition within the
plaintiffs' bar, as multiple firms can seek to assemble and actually litigate
opt-in class actions dealing with the same defendants and subject matter.
Competition ultimately benefits class members through reduced fees and
improved performance. In short, it is difficult to conclude that the opt-
out class action is unambiguously superior to the opt-in class action sim-
ply on the grounds that it confers finality.
In any event, finality and judicial economy can be given limited pro-
tection by other means. Arguably, an opt-in class might not be certified
unless a specified minimum percentage of the eligible claimants elected
to participate. Similarly, after an opt-in class is certified, there might be a
shortened statute of limitations within which parallel actions had to be
brought (either on a class or individual basis).




From a governance perspective, finance is central. The funder that
can best evaluate the action's prospective merits and monitor the attor-
ney's efforts should be willing to provide more funding and at lower cost
than others. In this regard, the contingent fee system of financing U.S.
class actions has some clear efficiency advantages. First, attorneys have
obvious expertise in evaluating the meritoriousness and settlement value
of litigation whereas other potential funders would need to hire lawyers
to conduct this inquiry for them. Second, attorneys are likely to be in-
volved in multiple lawsuits and can naturally realize the benefits of portfo-
lio diversification; this should enable them to reach litigation decisions in
a more objective, risk-neutral fashion. On the other hand, when the at-
torney finances the action, the possibility is lost that alternative funders
might monitor the attorney's performance. Arguably, attorney-financed
litigation is less optimal because class members lose the benefit of such an
arms-length party monitoring their attorney. To be sure, the PSLRA did
respond to this monitoring problem by deliberately creating an agent
(the lead plaintiff) to monitor class counsel, but this model can only be
safely extended to the relatively few litigation contexts where individual
plaintiffs are likely to hold sufficiently large stakes to induce them to
monitor.
Quite apart from any efficiency arguments, much of the world has
long resisted the contingent fee (and only recently have there been small
steps taken towards liberalizing this restriction) .157 The concern behind
this resistance has not been efficiency, but ethics-namely, the fear that
contingent fee financing compromises attorney loyalty and results in con-
flicts between the attorney and client. Although American commentators
believe this concern has been overstated,' 5 8 the prevalence of this con-
cern underlines the need to consider functional substitutes. Clearly,
157. England and Wales have allowed the "conditional fee," which allows the attorney
to waive attorney fees if the action is unsuccessful and permits an enhanced fee if the
action is successful. But this fee is not based on a percentage of the recovery and is
typically much more modest than American class action fee awards. This change was
largely motivated by a desire to finance personal injury litigation, not class actions. For an
overview, see Richard L. Abel, An American Hamburger Stand in St. Paul's Cathedral:
Replacing Legal Aid with Conditional Fees in English Personal Injury Litigation, 51 DePaul
L. Rev. 253 (2001). Sweden also permits "risk agreements" between the representative
plaintiff and the class counsel. In one recent case, this agreement provided that class
counsel would receive twice its usual hourly fee if successful and only one half that fee if
the case lost. Lindblom, supra note 127, at 21-22. This is a far milder enhancement or
reduction than is common in the United States, where the fee is fully contingent on
success and may sometimes exceed thirty percent of the recovery. See supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
158. Cf. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 12, at 197-202 (highlighting usefulness of
contingent fee system). This author tends to agree that this criticism has often been
overstated, but also believes that there is a case for insulating the class attorney, as the key




other potential sources of litigation finance are available. For example,
hedge funds, which increasingly invest in all forms of illiquid investments,
have long made higher risk investments and could easily fund many class
actions. Indeed, as discussed next, specialized litigation funding firms
with large investment portfolios have already arisen and prospered in
Australia and have begun to appear in the United Kingdom and Canada.
Nonetheless, issues remain.
1. The Australian and British Experiences. - In Australia, which does
not permit contingent fees,15 9 litigation funding by private firms has be-
come an accepted financial service industry, particularly since 2000.160
Some five firms now dominate the Australian market, and the largest is
listed on the Australian stock exchange.' 6 1 The scale of these firms is
shown by the fact that the largest held a portfolio of litigation investments
(as of early 2007) with a total value of A$1 billion.16 2 Unlike U.S. funding
firms (which invest almost exclusively in individual personal injury cases),
the Australian firms regularly invest in class actions, and the largest regu-
larly charges about thirty percent of the net proceeds of the case plus
litigation costs-a fee that roughly approximates what U.S. plaintiffs' at-
torneys traditionally received in class actions.16 3 As of the end of 2006,
the litigation funding industry in Australia was investing about A$20 mil-
lion annually to support plaintiffs' litigation, and the industry seemed to
be profitable.' 6 4
The key policy issue in litigation finance is whether the funder will
interfere with the attorney-client relationship between counsel and the
actual plaintiffs, thereby stripping the client of control. Thus, in the still
small U.S. litigation funding industry, the funding firm does not make
159. Under Australian law, an attorney may receive a normal fee plus an agreed uplift,
which is a percentage of its normal fee that is contingent on winning the case. Recent
legislation has capped this uplift at twenty-five percent in most Australian jurisdictions. See
Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, The Push to Reform Class Action Procedure in Australia:
Evolution or Revolution?, 32 Melb. U. L. Rev. 775, 789-90 (2008) ("[L]egislative caps have
now been introduced on the allowable uplift, with most Australian states imposing a
maximum uplift of 25 per cent of legal costs (excluding disbursements).").
160. For overviews of this trend, see Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing:
Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 Vill. L. Rev.
83, 107-12 (2008); Virginia Marsh, Australian Company Pioneers Approach, Fin. Times,
Jan. 5, 2007, at 3; Nikki Tait, Lawyers Test Litigation Funding Waters, Fin. Times, Jan. 5,
2007, at 3.
161. See Martin, supra note 160, at 107-08 (describing Australia's largest litigation
financing company). The largest, IMF, went public in 2001.
162. Id. at 107.
163. Id. For the comparable percentage fees charged by U.S. plaintiffs' attorneys in
securities cases, see Martin et al., supra note 59, at 141 (finding thirty-two percent to be
average fee award during 1990s).
164. Martin, supra note 160, at 109. Professor Martin estimates that the IMF, the
largest Australian litigation funding firm, earned A$8 million between 2002 and 2006, or a
roughly seven percent return per annum on its capital. Id. at 108.
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litigation decisions.' 6 5 In contrast, Australian litigation funders do ap-
pear to take an active role in the litigation, often selecting the law firm
and making important litigation decisions.166 They justify this involve-
ment by arguing that they do no more than do insurance companies on
the defense side of the litigation.16 7 In this view, the litigation funder is
the functional equivalent of the insurer (although insurance companies
negotiate typically with a sophisticated corporate client, while plaintiffs'
attorneys do not).
Following Australia, the United Kingdom, which also restricts contin-
gent fees, has also recently seen a litigation funding industry develop.168
The leading U.K firm charges between twenty-five percent and fifty per-
cent of the proceeds of a case,1 6 9 so that it is clearly a joint venturer with
the clients in the litigation. Hedge funds have also become active in the
U.K litigation funding business. 170
In both these countries and also in South Africa, the practice of
third-party litigation funding has received judicial acceptance. 17 1 But the
practice does not appear yet to have crossed the English Channel to
Europe. Nonetheless, it could.17 2 Because European class actions often
have a consumer association or other nonprofit body serve as the repre-
sentative plaintiff, such an institution could serve as the logical party to
165. For a discussion of U.S. litigation funding practices involving third-party lenders,
see Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 Vt.
L. Rev. 615, 617-24 (2007) (describing U.S. litigation funding companies' practices). The
major litigation funding firms in the United States entered into a settlement with the New
York Attorney General in 2005, which established a number of protections for the
consumer/litigant. Id. at 654-55; see also Martin, supra note 160, at 109 (noting in United
States, "litigation funders agree not to make any decisions about the lawsuits").
166. See Martin, supra note 160, at 109 (noting in Australia "litigation funders
provide the same services as insurance companies," who typically make key litigation
decisions for defendants).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 112-13.
169. Id. at 113.
170. Id.
171. The leading Australian decision is Campbells Cash & Carry Pty. Ltd. v. Fostif Pty.
Ltd. (2006) 229 A.L.R. 58. See Lee Aitken, Before the High Court-'Litigation Lending'
After Fostif An Advance in Consumer Protection, or a License to 'Bottomfeeders'?, 28
Sydney L. Rev. 171, 171 (2006) (describing potential problems with allowing litigation
funding). In the United Kingdom, the Civil Justice Council, an advisory public body, has
concluded that litigation funding provides a necessary role in assuring access to justice.
See Martin, supra note 160, at 112 ("In the UK, the Civil Justice Council concluded in
April 2007 that litigation funding played an important role in facilitating access to
justice . . . ."). The Supreme Court of South Africa in 2004 upheld a litigation funding
agreement against the claim that it was contrary to public policy. See Price Waterhouse
Coopers, Inc. v. Nat'l Potato Coop. Ltd. 2004 (6) SA 66 (SCA) at 79-80 (S. Mr.); see also
Martin, supra note 160, at 113-14 (analyzing decision).
172. Professor Christopher Hodges of Oxford University advises that insurance
companies in Europe are prepared to finance litigation costs on a "before the event" basis
for both plaintiffs and defendants, and he views insurers as the most likely candidates to
become third party funders of litigation in Europe. Hodges, supra note 10, at 227-28.
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negotiate the funding contract with the financier. Such a contract would
not seemingly violate the European rule against contingent fees, which
applies uniquely to attorneys.
2. The Issues in Third-Party Funding. - On an abstract level, little dis-
tinguishes the contingency fee from funding by a third party. Nor is the
involvement of a third party in litigation decisions unprecedented, as in-
surance companies regularly monitor the progress of the litigation in
cases they are funding. But some differences do exist. First, the attorney
as funder is subject to professional rules and culture that insist on loyalty
to the client. Nothing similarly constrains a hedge fund as a source of
litigation funding. Second, at least in some litigation contexts, such as
environmental law, employment discrimination, and civil rights, injunc-
tive and equitable relief may be as important to the class as money dam-
ages (or more so). Predictably, a third party funder will be interested
only in the economic return, whereas the attorney may gain reputational
value from a litigation victory, even if the damages are modest. Hence,
third party funding may affect the balance of monetary versus nonmone-
tary relief in settlements.
Use of a third party funder also increases the number of agents with
a self-interest in the case that is distinct from the client's. Is this good or
bad? A plausible case can be made that if the funder is restricted in terms
of the control that it can exercise over the case, this is a less troubling
relationship than having the attorney fund the case because the attorney
will always have a controlling influence over litigation decisions. One can
at least imagine a structure under which third-party funding is permitted,
but the class counsel is instructed that all litigation decisions must be
made in the interest of the class. Because class counsel would be denied
a contingent fee under this structure, it might prove more loyal to the
class than it is today when its economic interests and fiduciary duty some-
times point in divergent directions. The conventional wisdom about
large contingent fees is that they can motivate the attorney to settle pre-
maturely. A third-party funder might also have such an incentive, but if
the attorney were paid on a noncontingent basis, the attorney would have
little, if any, incentive to settle early (and may even wish to stretch out the
litigation, so long as the attorney is paid on an hourly rate basis). Hence,
the attorney's self-interest would counterbalance those of the litigation
funder.
A structure in which the class has both a class counsel and a separate
litigation funder is inherently one in which "agents are watching
agents."17 3 This has advantages, as the litigation funder would be in a
position to monitor the attorney, while both the representative plaintiff
173. Some argue that this is a desirable structure, because the self-interest of the
agents motivates them to watch each other. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching
Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 817-18 (1992)
(assessing potential for oversight of corporate managers by institutional money managers).
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(often a nonprofit organization in Europe) and class counsel could nego-
tiate the financial arrangement with the third-party funding firm.
C. Deterrence
Much commentary has emphasized that the principal rationale for
the class action is deterrence, not compensation.' 7 4 In this regard, the
opt-out action obviously outperforms the opt-in action-unless there can
be too much of a good thing. Clearly, the opt-out action can aggregate
more claims and at lower cost, giving the plaintiffs' attorney greater nego-
tiating leverage. But maximizing the leverage of the plaintiffs attorney
without limit may not always be desirable.17 5 Consider the following hy-
pothetical involving an ordinary securities class action. The stock of XYZ
Corporation, a publicly traded firm, falls thirty percent over a two to
three day period, resulting in a total market capitalization decline of $2
billion. The cause of this decline may have been accounting irregularities
and fraud, or it may have been the market's panicky reaction to adverse
developments in the firm's industry or general macroeconomic
problems. Let us assume further that there is only a thirty percent possi-
bility that XYZ Corporation can be held liable for securities fraud. But if
an opt-out class action seeking $2 billion is certified and survives pretrial
motions to dismiss, XYZ Corporation will likely feel compelled to settle
because it cannot take the risk of ajury imposing liability in that amount,
which would bankrupt it. Hence, it believes it must settle, and, as a result,
the negotiations largely focus on how much it can pay and at what point it
might prefer to file for bankruptcy.
Next, assume this same case arises ina jurisdiction that permits only
opt-in class actions, and that, after active solicitation by class counsel,
twenty-five percent of the shareholders who have standing to sue opt in.
Now XYZ Corporation faces a maximum liability of not $2 billion, but
$500 million (i.e., twenty-five percent of the total eligible claimants). As a
result, it may be prepared to risk going to trial. At the same time, because
claims equal to $500 million have been aggregated, this is hardly a case in
which "negative value" claimants are at the mercy of defendants because
174. For representative arguments, see Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action,
supra note 4, at 1536, 1547-56 (discussing deterrence rationale for securities class actions);
Mitchell, supra note 4, at 246-48 (same).
175. When the tide began to turn against broad class certification in the mid-1990s,
one of the most influential decisions arguing against liberal certification standards was
written by Judge Richard Posner. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299,
1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting mandamus order to decertify multibillion dollar class
action because of intense settlement pressures and danger that single jury verdict could
destroy industry). He stressed that class certification in a mass tort case placed defendants
"under intense pressure to settle," even when the litigation merits seemed weak. Id. at
1298. He added, however, that this pressure had to be "balanced against the undoubted
benefits of the class action." Id. at 1299. Presumably, he was referring chiefly to the
problem of "negative value" claims. This Essay agrees that a balance needs to be struck,
and neither the opt-in nor the opt-out class action inherently achieves such a balance.
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they cannot afford to sue. This action is economically viable, but not so
overwhelming in scale that the defendant is compelled to settle. Of
course, one could change these facts and posit that only ten percent of
the eligible claimants opt in to the class, and at this point the action
might not be viable or the resulting damages or the likely settlement
might be insufficient to deter. Ultimately, the bottom line is that, de-
pending on how we design the class action, a middle zone could be cre-
ated between underdeterrence and overdeterrence.
The dilemma here is compounded by the fact that public policy is
essentially seeking to deter corporate managers from defrauding the cor-
poration's shareholders by imposing large financial damages on the cor-
poration. Because these damages are borne in turn by the shareholders,
there is a perverse circularity to such a system.1 76 Moreover, because the
gain from fraud to these managers is certain to be far less than the total
gain to the corporate entity, it should in theory be easier and more effi-
cient to focus on deterring managers. In any event, to the extent that the
corporation is made the target of deterrence and the damages borne by it
are not fully shifted to fall on the responsible managers, it is never clear
at what point the expected penalty is sufficient to overcome their incen-
tive to commit fraud. At best, adequate deterrence will be a matter of
happenstance and contingencies and does not follow automatically from
corporate liability.
Within the United States, there is no prospect of a change away from
an opt-out class to an opt-in system. But in Europe and elsewhere, where
there is little experience with private enforcement, few see it as necessa-
rily desirable that the opt-out class action aggregates damages to the mul-
tibillion dollar level, simply because class members failed to opt out. If
one believes that the merits of the case should determine the outcome, it
is a virtue of the opt-in structure that it is less likely to overwhelm defend-
ants by the pressure of damages.
D. Legal Culture and Constitutional Structure
The United States has long accepted the concept of the private attor-
ney general,1 77 but the idea is novel and unfamiliar to Europe. From the
176. For a fuller discussion of this circularity problem, see Coffee, Reforming the
Securities Class Action, supra note 4, at 1556-61.
177. The term "private attorney general" was coined by Judge Jerome Frank in
Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943)
("Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals."). For a
historical and contemporary overview of the term's use and misuse, see William B.
Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It Matters, 57 Vand. L.
Rev. 2129 (2004). Despite the relatively recent origin of the term, the concept of private
enforcers using civil litigation to supplement public enforcement dates back to the early
days of the Republic, and the qui tam action (in which an enforcer who has not suffered an
injury sues to recover primarily on behalf of the government, who will in turn compensate
it with a portion of the recovery) can be traced back to the fourteenth century in England.
For a review of the historical antecedents to the modern "private attorney general"
344 [Vol. 110:288
LITIGATION GOVERNANCE
U.S. perspective, the private attorney general is a desirable failsafe mecha-
nism: If regulators are "captured" by special interests, private litigation
through class actions can still vindicate the rights of citizens. In this
sense, the private attorney general is another check on the abuse of gov-
ernmental power in a constitutional system committed from its outset to
the need for checks and balances. 7 8 Empowering private attorneys gen-
eral enables direct access to a judiciary that is expected to resist over-
reaching. But this concept of an active judiciary-one prepared to resist
abuses of power by the other branches of government-is far from uni-
versally held. Although the United States emphasizes checks and bal-
ances, Europe (including the United Kingdom) places greater faith in
legislative supremacy, and thus it is uncomfortable with an activist style of
judicial review, which it fears as antidemocratic. 179 The role of the judici-
ary in civil law countries is more to implement the government's policies
than to review or resist them. Given this fundamental difference in start-
ing points, it follows predictably that Europe will be less prepared to ac-
cept the case for the private attorney general-particularly when the pri-
vate attorney general manifests itself as the aggressively profit-seeking
bounty hunter (which is how Europe perceives the American class action
plaintiffs' bar).
Against this backdrop, the difference between the opt-in and the opt-
out class action for Europe is the difference between evolution and
revolution. To be sure, some transition may occur. Given Europe's famil-
iarity with aggregate litigation led by associations-e.g., consumer groups
and nonprofit organizations-it may become acceptable for such a repre-
concept, see Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103
Mich. L. Rev. 589, 599-602 (2003). The "bounty hunter" of the nineteenth century
American West is but one example of the concept, as is the treble damages action
authorized by the federal antitrust laws. Few parallels, if any, to the private attorney
general exist in Europe.
178. Some American legal scholars, however, do reject the private attorney general
concept on the ground that it has not been legislatively authorized (in most cases) and so
represents a usurpation of legislative power. See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the
Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals,
2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 71, 81-83 (objecting to absence of legislative authority for "bounty
hunter" model of private enforcement). This Essay does not take this position, but
acknowledges the connection between one's constitutional theory and one's view of the
private attorney general.
179. Professor Mark Tushnet has distinguished two models of constitutionalism that
have evolved over the last century: (1) a legislative model of parliamentary supremacy; and
(2) the U.S. model of "constrained parliamentarianism," in which a written constitution
limits both the legislature and the majority. Mark Tushnet, New Forms ofJudicial Review
and the Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 813,
813-14 (2003). The private attorney general fits much less comfortably within the former
system (in part for the reasons stressed by Professor Redish). See Redish, supra note 178,




sentative plaintiff to contract with counsel for a contingent fee.1 80 So
long as all class members who subsequently opt-in have notice of the con-
tingent fee's terms, opting in on this basis would amount to an implied-
in-fact consent, thus distinguishing this fee arrangement from the
American form of contingent fee. Alternatively, litigation funding firms
may enter Europe. Viewed optimistically, this would imply additional
monitoring of class counsel's performance. Viewed pessimistically, it
could mean a new set of agency costs and conflicts. It is simply too early
to make confident predictions.
E. A Nonentrepreneuial Model
Europe seems likely to continue to resist entrepreneurial litigation
because it sees the critical actor in this model-the plaintiffs attorney-
as both self-appointed and self-interested. Yet, at the same time, a demo-
cratic or communitarian model relying on voice-based governance would
be hopelessly unrealistic, both because (1) there is little natural commu-
nity among unrelated and dispersed consumers, and (2) the holders of
negative value claims will often remain rationally apathetic.
So what is left? The model that might be applied to the European
context with the least strain and distortion to its existing institutional
structure is the model that currently applies to public interest litigation in
the United States. This model relies not on a lead plaintiff (i.e., the vol-
unteering class member who has experienced the most severe injury), but
instead on a nonprofit organization that has attracted membership sup-
port based on its expertise, commitment, and past success. Although the
lead plaintiff can be objective and neutral, as CalPERS and other large
pension funds typically have been, it is unlikely to be the same committed
advocate that the ACLU, NAACP, or Sierra Club have been. After all, the
primary responsibility of a pension fund is to protect its beneficiaries'
retirement savings. Uniquely, public interest and consumer organiza-
tions have at least three obvious advantages over the large investors who
today serve as lead plaintiffs in the United States: (1) they can more cred-
ibly solicit potential class members to opt in; (2) they possess greater ex-
pertise about the subject matter of the litigation than lead plaintiffs; and
(3) they can look beyond the individual case and develop a long-term
litigation strategy. 81 Beyond these differences, there is an even larger
180. This appears to have already happened to a degree in Australia, the United
Kingdom, and Sweden. See supra notes 157, 159 and accompanying text. But the risk-
adjusted contingent fee in these countries is not based on a percentage of the recovery and
hence is far more modest than the typical fee award in U.S. securities litigation. See
Martin et al., supra note 59, at 141 (finding average fee award in securities class actions to
be thirty-two percent of recovery during 1990s).
181. Historically, public interest organizations, such as the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, did formulate long-term litigation strategies, sometimes fashioning plans that took a
decade or more to implement. See Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate, supra note 49, at
1627-44 (discussing "disputes among group members and lawyers in civil rights
campaigns"); see also Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated
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advantage: The typical public interest or nonprofit body has reputational
capital and desires to protect it. In contrast, the lead plaintiff in securi-
ties litigation in the United States may have a large financial stake, but as
a public or union pension fund, it does not necessarily possess reputa-
tional capital. Even where the typical lead plaintiff has some reputational
capital (i.e., its identity is known and respected), it does not inherently
pledge that capital to assure class members that it will be loyal to their
interests. After all, pension funds are expected to manage money, not
protect the public interest. Put simply, reputational capital is a solution
to problems of accountability because the public interest plaintiff inher-
ently pledges it to assure class members of its loyal and competent
performance.1 8 2
Opt-in class actions necessarily require a more passionate champion
if they are to work. Such champions do exist, as Europe has representa-
tive groups prepared to play such a role by using litigation as a means
toward their broader aims of consumer or environmental protection. In
contrast, alternative candidates for class action leadership roles, such as
the U.S. lead plaintiff, are unlikely to transplant well to Europe. Not only
will the neutral and objective lead plaintiff be unlikely to entice opt-ins,
but, outside the special context of securities litigation, few class members
hold sufficiently large stakes to have any interest in playing this role. In-
stead, the class may be entirely composed of "negative value" claimants.
Hence, even the claimant with the largest stake may still have only a mod-
est financial claim, and such claimants are easily captured by en-
trepreneurial attorneys. Public interest organizations are, however, more
accountable to their members, from whom they receive their primary fi-
nancial support.
To be sure, public interest organizations are also subject to conflicts
of interest, and some have feared that delegating the control of class ac-
tions to them could infringe on individual liberty.1 83 But the opt-in class
Education 1925-1950, at 138-66 (1987) (noting legal tactics NAACP lawyers used in
complex litigation).
182. The plaintiffs' attorney in a class action is a form of "gatekeeper" on whom
dispersed class members must rely for services that they cannot perform or closely monitor
themselves. Such gatekeepers are often relied upon in the financial markets and they
essentially function as "reputational intermediaries" who pledge a reputational capital that
they acquire over many years and many clients to assure their clients of their loyal
performance in an individual case. The classic example would be the auditing firm, for
whom the gain in auditing fees from acquiescing in its client's fraud cannot normally
exceed the loss in reputational capital and future business. See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 2-5 (2006) (explaining role of
gatekeepers in capital markets). Thus, the bottom line assertion here is that a
representative plaintiff with greater reputational capital than the typical lead plaintiff
would make a superior gatekeeper.
183. See Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate, supra note 49, at 1663-64 (noting danger
of "elitist subversion of democratic equality" and "infringement on individual liberty").
The fear here is largely that the representative group, for political or ideological reasons,
may decline to represent legally meritorious claims or may refuse to assert legally valid, but
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action minimizes this danger. By definition, such an action is less likely
to infringe on individual liberty because it requires individual consent.
Also, such an approach permits multiple groups to pursue the same or
similar litigation goals contemporaneously, each making the arguments
of their choice. 184 Under this model, individual litigants opt in because
of the credibility and prior track record of the representative plaintiff.
This model is not, however, premised on democratic or communitar-
ian principles, which apply poorly to collections of dispersed individuals
lacking any inherent sense of community. No votes would be taken, but
those dissatisfied could opt out at some point prior to judicial resolution
of the action. The representative would hire class counsel and could,
subject to judicial supervision, fire them. The representative could also
negotiate litigation funding arrangements with third-party funders, in ef-
fect assigning them some portion of the proceeds up to a ceiling. These
arms-length negotiations with the financial entrepreneur would not, how-
ever, place the entrepreneur in control of the action or enable it to make
litigation decisions. That is a key advantage: The entrepreneur does not
control the litigation. 185 The representative plaintiff could deduct all its
costs from the action proceeds, but it would be limited to no more than a
modest profit in order to ensure that its entrepreneurial incentive not
trump its ideological commitment. Class counsel might negotiate an en-
hanced or reduced fee based on success (or failure), but would not func-
tion as the entrepreneurial risk-taker that it does in the United States.
In summary, the advantages of a system built around a nonen-
trepreneurial nonprofit organization serving as the lead plaintiff are:
(1) Such an organization would be generally available to serve, par-
ticularly in those "negative value" class actions where no large stakehold-
ers exist or are willing to take on that role;186
politically objectionable, legal theories, thus leaving potential class members without
effective representation.
184. In this sense, this model does not realize the goals that Professor Rubenstein
favors, because his "expertise model" allows the experts to screen out and censor legal
arguments that the experts consider either frivolous or premature. Instead, under the
variant proposed here, all that would be required is that one of potentially multiple
representative groups would be willing to adopt the particular legal theory.
185. This could make litigation funding more expensive, as the third-party funder
might demand a larger percentage of the proceeds for being denied control rights. The
goal is not to restrict the funder's profit, but its control, as control would typically remain
with the nonprofit organization.
186. Institutional shareholders face a number of conflicts that often make them
reluctant to serve. Sometimes, for example, they hold stock in both the bankrupt
corporation which is the subject of the litigation and other defendants. Thus, their
recovery may be offset by the reduction in value of other stocks in their portfolio.
Professors Cox and Thomas provide an example of such a case in the WorldCom litigation
(where Citigroup was the principal defendant). See Cox & Thomas, Does the Plaintiff




(2) It would have more experience with the policy issues in the field
than the typical pension fund which serves as a lead plaintiff in the
United States; by definition, it is a repeat player with an experienced in-
house legal staff and it should be capable of a long-term view extending
over multiple cases;
(3) Inherently, as a committed advocate of a particular cause
(whether the environment, minority rights or consumer protection), it is
pledging its reputational capital, thereby both attracting potential class
members to opt in and assuring them of its loyalty; a pension fund or
other U.S.-style lead plaintiff could not hope to match its demonstrated
commitment;
(4) It would be less vulnerable to most economic conflicts of interest
(such as those engendered by "pay-to-play" practices); and
(5) It should be open and receptive to nonpecuniary relief, which in
environmental and antidiscrimination litigation may be as important (or
more so) than maximizing the monetary recovery.
On the other side of the ledger, because the aggregate damages are
lower in an opt-in class action, the deterrent threat is reduced. From a
deterrent perspective, such a proceeding would threaten a civil penalty,
not bankruptcy. But it is at least arguable that this change is desirable, as
profit-motivated entrepreneurs should not be allowed to threaten eco-
nomic nuclear destruction. Also, less driven by the pursuit of the maxi-
mum damages, such a nonprofit plaintiff might screen its cases more
carefully, exercise some prosecutorial discretion in the choice of cases,
and seek to develop a long-term litigation strategy extending over years
and multiple actions. Ultimately, the political acceptability of this model
might be its primary advantage, and over the long run its lesser vulnera-
bility to corruption and conflict of interest would tend to ensure its
survival.
To implement this model, the critical step would be to require the
court to find, as a precondition for class certification, that the representa-
tive plaintiff possessed adequate expertise, experience, and commitment
to protect the interests of the class members. The certifying court might
consider rival applications for this position, but would not permit defend-
ants to appear or object at this stage. Other rival opt-in classes could be
certified if they were also headed by a similarly qualified representative
plaintiff, and they could engage in competitive solicitations for class
members. Over time, some real competition might thereby develop.
CONCLUSION
From a litigation governance perspective, the critical questions about
aggregate litigation involve basic issues of governance. If one desires to
structure the governance system for aggregate litigation so as to achieve a
balance under which the litigation merits are not overwhelmed by either
the threat of astronomic liability or the certainty of transaction costs that
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exceed the individual litigant's expected recovery, one must address four
central questions:
How much power can safely be accorded to private enforcers? Power
corrupts, and the class counsel in the traditional opt-out class action had
virtually unaccountable power. To be sure, this enforcer was generally
motivated to maximize the aggregate recovery, but sometimes it found
ways to profit at the expense of the class. In the opt-in class action led by
a public interest organization, the key enforcer will be more accountable
and will in effect be pledging its reputational capital as a true gatekeeper.
How much claim aggregation is desirable? Although aggregation is
necessary to enable the "negative value" claimant to have access to the
courts, the contemporary opt-out class carries this idea to the limits of its
logic (and perhaps beyond) by threatening astronomic liability.
How entrepreneurially driven should aggregate litigation be? This
translates into three subsidiary questions: Should the attorney fund such
litigation? Or is it safer to maintain the attorney's professional indepen-
dence and rely upon third-party funders (as Australia now does)? Finally,
to what degree should the entrepreneur be restricted in its control over
the litigation?
How can the law best minimize principal/agent conflicts in aggre-
gate litigation? This Essay has suggested that greater reliance should be
placed on both competition and the use of reputational capital to achieve
greater accountability.
This Essay does not purport to have solved any of these problems,
but it has suggested intermediate positions along a continuum. Its spe-
cific suggestions have been modest: First, exit may outperform voice,
chiefly because the former encourages competition while also disciplin-
ing the class counsel who negotiates a weak settlement. Second, alterna-
tive designs for aggregate litigation-including the opt-in class action and
third party litigation funding-are not as implausible as some U.S. com-
mentators have deemed them. Finally, one size does not fit all; legal envi-
ronments differ; and rules that work well in one system may transplant
poorly to another. Just as corporate governance in the United States,
with its characteristic system of dispersed stock ownership, is different
from corporate governance in Europe, with its characteristic system of
concentrated ownership, so too will the procedural forms for aggregate
litigation differ across legal cultures. In the last analysis, Europe does not
accept the private attorney general model that has long dominated U.S.
legal thinking and, as a result, Europe will likely insist that the attorney
remain an agent and not become an entrepreneur.
Even litigation run by public-regarding representative plaintiffs who
are primarily accountable to their members still needs to be financed,
and thus someone must make cost/benefit decisions. Butjust as bankers
finance small companies without determining their business decisions, it
is certainly possible (and possibly desirable) to divorce the litigation
funder from a control position with respect to litigation decisions.
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The most likely scenario for the future is that Europe and the United
States will experience functional convergence without doctrinal conver-
gence. Differences will remain. Europe's opt-in class action will never be
the potent threat that the United States's opt-out class action has long
been; nor will third party litigation funding develop overnight (although
its impact has already been felt); finally, insurance may only slowly over-
come the disincentive toward litigation that Europe's common "loser
pays" rule creates. But over time, functional substitutes could emerge
that reduce the sharp disparities that today exist in litigation practices
between the United States and Europe.
At the same time, the United States is witnessing growing judicial
disenchantment with the large class action, and the last decade has seen
an almost unbroken tide of decisions making it increasingly difficult to
certify a class action in a number of litigation contexts. This growing re-
sistance to class certification is less a response to express doctrinal limita-
tions clearly set forth in the federal rules and more a reaction to evidence
of corruption and a widespread sense that no one truly benefits from
many class action settlements. As a result, as Europe seeks to develop a
procedural mechanism for aggregate litigation and as the United States
seeks to control the mechanism that it has, both legal systems could meet
at some intermediate point in the not too distant future. Neither side
would be seeking convergence, but both might arrive there, starting from
opposite poles and driven by a common need to strike a balance.
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